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Abstract: In the main part of the article, a new, idealizing-hermeneutic methodological approach to developing 
a theory of philosophical arguments is presented and carried out. The basis for this is a theory of ideal 
philosophical theory types developed from the analysis of historical examples. According to this theory, the 
following ideal types of theory exist in philosophy: 1. descriptive-nomological, 2. idealizing-hermeneutic, 3. 
technical-constructive, 4. ontic-practical. These types of theories are characterized in particular by what their 
basic types of theses are. The main task of this article is then to determine the types of arguments that are 
suitable for justifying these types of theses. Surprisingly, practical arguments play a key role here. 
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1. Theories of philosophical types of argument: 1. the bottom-up approach 
 
In philosophy, there is a fair amount of argumentation – though less than one would expect – 
and argumentation is essential to systematic philosophy. Accordingly, there are collections of 
important philosophical arguments (e.g. Bruce & Barbone 2011) and theories of 
philosophical arguments or introductions to philosophical argumentation (Harrell 2016; 
Nelson <1921; 2011> 2016; Passmore 1961; Tetens 2004). A positive theory of philosophical 
argumentation could try to determine more or less empirically, within the set of (clearly 
understandable and reasonably successful) philosophical arguments, the types of the 
individual arguments, thereby arriving at a list of philosophical argument types that is as 
complete as possible – similar to taxonomy in biology. The next step would then be to 
develop criteria of validity for these argument types – as far as they are not already contained 
in the usual general validity criteria for arguments. Finally, a theory of these types could be 
developed: Why are there exactly these types? What is the systematics behind them? Which 
questions are answered by them? I call this approach to a theory of philosophical types of 
arguments the "bottom-up approach". In this section I will explain why the bottom-up 
approach is not fruitful and, starting in the next section, develop an alternative approach: an 
idealizing-hermeneutic approach. 
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For the classification of philosophical arguments within the bottom-up approach, two 
classification methods (or better: groups of classification methods) are especially suitable: 1. 
a general theory of argument types or argument schemes and 2. a list of classical 
philosophical argumentation figures, as they are occasionally suggested as typically 
philosophical: transcendental arguments, thought experiments, reduction ad absurdum, 
arguments from intuition etc. 
1. Classification of philosophical argument types according to a general theory of 
argument types: There are a number of general theories of argument types or schemes; I will 
base myself here on one developed in epistemological argumentation theory, because it is 
congenial to the truth and reasoning claims of philosophy: Lumer 2011a (for the 
philosophical foundation of this approach: Lumer 2005). According to this approach, a 
distinction is made between elementary and molecular argumentations, where molecular 
arguments are composed of elementary arguments in such a way that the thesis of a lower-
level elementary argument is the premise of a higher-level argument, thus creating a tree 
structure. The elementary types of arguments, in turn, are distinguished according to their 
epistemological foundations, namely the epistemological principles taken from various 
philosophical theories on which they are based and which guarantee the acceptability of the 
thesis justified by such an argument, e.g. the deductive epistemological principle: 'A 
proposition is true if it is logically implied by true propositions'. According to the 
epistemological theory of argument types there are then (at least) three groups of elementary 
argument types: deductive, probabilistic and practical argument types. (Practical argument 
consist of listing and netting the advantages and disadvantages of a value object, or more 
precisely: of listing relevant (probabilistic) consequences of the value object and the 
valuations of these consequences as well as the intrinsic valuation of the value object itself 
and finally netting these valuations). (These three types of argumentation cannot be reduced 
to one another because of their different pragmatic conditions of validity and situational 
adequacy: (Valid) deductive arguments are the only arguments that in principle prove with 
certainty and are monotonous, i.e. they cannot be overthrown by new information. 
Probabilistic arguments, instead, always refer to a certain database; a change, improvement 
of this database can make a valid and previously adequate argumentation inadequate; it is 
then epistemically no longer rational to use this once accepted argument as a basis for one's 
belief in the thesis. And practical arguments often contain firstly probabilistic components 
and secondly their validity is based on completeness conditions, the fulfilment of which 
cannot be positively proven, namely that all relevant consequences are covered in the 
argumentation.) 
The impression one gets from the lists of the most famous philosophical arguments and 
textbooks of philosophical argumentation is that philosophical arguments are deductive. In 
the collection and systematization of 100 arguments from seven sub-disciplines of philosophy 
by Bruce & Barbone (2011), all these arguments are reconstructed as deductive arguments 
(with indication of the premises and the conclusion etc.) The books by Harrell (2016), Nelson 
(<1921; 2011> 2016) and Tetens (2004) also give the impression that philosophical 
arguments are (almost) exclusively deductive. 
But this impression is wrong. There are also many non-deductive arguments in 
philosophy, especially practical ones - for example, Hobbes' contractualist justification of the 
absolutist state (Leviathan) is a practical argument for the thesis that this state order is clearly 
better than the natural state and paretosuperior to it - but also probabilistic and statistical ones 
- just think of empirical philosophy, astonishingly grown since the noughties (Mizrahi & 
Dickinson 2020), which wants to establish hypotheses of general laws. The constructive part 
of this article shows that these argument types are even systematically more central in 
philosophy than deductive arguments. 
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(There are several reasons for the appearance of deductivism in philosophy. 1. Non-
deductive arguments are much less well known in philosophy than deductive ones and are 
also much worse theorized. That is why neither the arguers themselves nor the argumentation 
analysts usually know the non-deductive types of arguments. And because the arguers have 
no patterns and sets of rules for them, the non-deductive argumentations presented in 
philosophy, especially the practical ones, are usually much more unclear and fuzzy than 
deductive ones; they are often only rudimentarily present, rather incomplete and not 
canonized in form, thus almost amorphous. 2. The theorists also recognize the non-deductive 
argumentations even worse. (An example is the analysis of Pascal's wager in Bruce & 
Barbone (2011, No. 5): It is quite obviously a practical, decision-theoretical argument. The 
analyst Burkholder initially reconstructs this as a decision-theoretical argument, but finally 
presses it into the form of a deductive argument (modus ponens). This is done with the help 
of an additional premise (P3) based on the deductive minimum 1 – and this is the problem of 
such deductivist reconstructions using the deductive minimum (Govier 1992, pp. 399-404; 
Lumer 2019, p. 775) – which are not epistemically accessible to the addressee: Neither does 
he believe in the truth of these premises beforehand in a well-founded way, nor can he 
recognize them as true ad hoc, nor is he guided to recognize them by argumentation). 3. 
Deductive arguments are often reasonably well ordered and concise. By contrast, practical 
arguments eat up a lot of space. For example, first the value objects themselves, such as the 
rules of a constitution or a system for evaluating scientific hypotheses, must be presented in 
detail; then the consequences can be very complex and also require elaborate presentation. 
Thus, it is possible that the individual argument covers an entire book or most of it. In this 
case there are often no argumentation indicators, but the argumentative relationship must be 
recognized by the content. All this makes it considerably more difficult to recognize the 
argument. Even the actual thesis is difficult to find and is then also wrongly formulated; or it 
even remains implicit. 4. And arguments for empirical nomological hypotheses are classified 
by many philosophers from the outset as scientific rather than philosophical - often on the 
basis of a Kant inspired aprioristic demarcation criterion of philosophy from the sciences.) 
In philosophy, however, there are not only certain types of deductive, practical and 
probabilistic as well as statistical arguments, but within these groups also most of the 
argument types that are also used elsewhere (list with important argument types in these 
groups: Lumer 2011a, pp. 20-26). This holds simply for the reason alone that philosophers, as 
comprehensive meta-theorists, use statements from almost all areas of life and science in the 
development and substantiation of their theses and theories – from mathematics to theoretical 
physics, jurisprudence, text interpretation, art history to neurophysiology, euthanasia or the 
psychology of love relationships, to name but a few – which can then also be substantiated 
with the most diverse arguments. One could object to the relevance of this statement by 
saying that one then has to distinguish the actually philosophical part of philosophical 
argumentation from the applied part, which is often taken from other sciences, whereby only 
the former are relevant for a theory of philosophical argumentation. But this reply already 
presupposes that core statements and arguments of philosophy can be distinguished from 
subordinate statements and arguments. This distinction, however, goes beyond the limits of a 
bottom-up strategy; this distinction can only be developed and justified within the framework 
of a metaphilosophy of the tasks and theory types of philosophy. This is precisely the 
approach that will be developed in the following sections of this article. Conversely, there is 
                                                 
1
  The deductive minimum is a premise, intended to make an inconclusive argument deductively valid, of 
the following form: If the argument consists of the premises p1, ..., pn, and the thesis t, then the missing 
premise is the material implication connecting these two components: 'p1&…&pn → t'. The deductive 
minimum is a device proposed by deductivists to transform a nondeductive argument into a deductive 
one. The problem with this proposal is that though it resolves a problem of deductive invalidity it 
typically creates problems of the argument's situational adequacy. 
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no formal argument type in philosophy that is not also used in other areas of life or science. 
So also in this way one cannot develop a theory of philosophical arguments. 
So we can record so far: Philosophical arguments are not a separate formal type of 
argument; and almost all formal epistemologically differentiated types of argument occur in 
philosophy. The bottom-up approach on the basis of an epistemological differentiation of 
argumentation types is therefore a non-starter: By having to recognize almost all formal 
argumentation types as philosophical, i.e. used in philosophy, it does not lead to an 
informative differentiation of philosophical from other argumentations. An alternative to this 
approach is to find philosophical types of theory on a metaphilosophical level with the central 
and flanking types of theses they establish and then to identify the corresponding arguments. 
This approach is pursued below. 
2. Classifying philosophical argument types according to typical philosophical 
argumentation figures: An alternative bottom-up approach is to collect typical philosophical 
argument figures and then develop a theory for this collection. As "argument figure" I refer 
here to certain types of arguments with certain types of theses or reasons that are determined 
by content or form; these types of arguments can be elementary or complex. An argument 
figure goes beyond an epistemologically determined formal type of argument, because its 
contents can and usually are determined by the subject or the type of reasoning. A 
philosophical argument figure is then a figure of argument with philosophical contents which 
is typical for philosophy (frequently used and characteristic). Important and frequently 
mentioned philosophical argument figures are, among others: transcendental arguments, 
thought experiments, arguments from intuition, reductio ad absurdum, references to a self-
contradiction or an apparently contradictory set of theses, language-critical arguments (cf. 
e.g. Passmore 1961; Tetens 2004). Among these, in my opinion the transcendental arguments 
are the only exclusively philosophical argument figures. According to Tetens, their central 
premise is: 'What one must assume for conceptual reasons in the rational reference to objects 
is the case.' (Tetens 2004, p. 74); other premises then specify what "one must assume for 
conceptual reasons in the rational reference to objects". The formula in quotation marks is 
quite unclear and in need of interpretation in several places, and therefore invites highly 
speculative and methodologically obscure considerations. I therefore doubt whether this kind 
of reasoning can lead to a good philosophy. However, such transcendental arguments are 
certainly not the only form of meaningful philosophical arguments and make up at most a 
small part of philosophical arguments. 
There are several objections against the bottom-up approach based on philosophical 
figures of argument: 1. Although these figures are typically philosophical, i.e. they occur 
more often in philosophy and usually do not occur in other disciplines, they are not 
informative for understanding philosophy. They can be used to clarify individual 
philosophical questions, but these are not necessarily the central questions. And when one 
knows these arguments and knows that they are typical for philosophy, one does not yet 
know why they occur in philosophy and what connection they have to the fundamental 
questions of philosophy. 2. The figures mentioned above occur particularly frequently in 
philosophy. But many of them are also used outside philosophy: Thought experiments, 
argumentations on the basis of intuitions, the practical reduction ad absurdum, references to a 
self-contradiction, language-critical arguments. 3. If, as has just been stated, more or less all 
epistemologically differentiated types of arguments occur in philosophy (and also the 
philosophical figures of argument can be reconstructed as such types of argument (with a 
certain content)), then the list of these argument figures is by no means exhaustive. It does not 
cover all types of arguments used in philosophy and especially important types of arguments 
such as practical arguments. Some of the characteristics of philosophy seem to be lost in this 
way. 
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2. Theories of philosophical types of argument: 2. the idealizing-hermeneutic approach 
 
The positive lesson from the failure of bottom-up approaches is that a substantial theory of 
philosophical types of argument must be based on a theory of philosophical theory types 
which determines the subject of the central statements, i.e. the types of theses or more 
precisely: the complexes of theses of such philosophical theories and thus also the questions 
to which these theories provide answers. Once the types of theses have been determined, the 
next step is to determine the types of arguments by which these theses can be justified. In the 
next section four such types of theories are presented: 1. descriptive-nomological, 2. 
idealising-hermeneutic, 3. technical-constructive and 4. ontic-practical theories. For 
dialectical safeguarding, some common conceptions of philosophical methods that are not 
covered by this list, namely methodological intuitionism and naturalism, will also be briefly 
discussed and criticized. 
These brief announcements may sound as if a top-down approach is now being 
presented after the criticism of bottom-up approaches – the theorist devises a priori certain 
philosophical theory types and types of arguments belonging to them, which one then tries to 
find among the arguments actually presented – which has little to do with the empirical 
reality of philosophising and therefore cannot be usefully used to analyse topical arguments. 
However, this would be a misunderstanding. For the theory presented in the following is not a 
top-down approach in this sense, but an idealizing-hermeneutic theory. Indeed, as a starting 
point for the actual argumentation-theoretical part, it presents several types of philosophical 
theories, which are distinguished by the type of (true) theses they strive for. However, this list 
of types of theories is not developed a priori, but rather idealizing-hermeneutically: The first 
step in the research procedure is to examine a wealth of philosophical theories in order to 
determine which fundamental philosophical question they are actually intended to answer; in 
particular, hierarchization is necessary: What is the fundamental question? Which questions 
are subordinate, treat only partial aspects or aim at premises for answering the basic question? 
(Instead of speaking of the "search for the basic question", one can of course also speak of the 
"search for the fundamental true thesis aimed at in this theory (from a content-related 
spectrum of theses)"). After all, many philosophical arguments, especially in journal articles, 
only aim at answering subordinate special questions. Finding the basic questions is not easy. 
Some authors declare that their publication or argumentation is intended to contribute to 
answering a higher-level question; others have no idea at all about this, but simply orient 
themselves on the fact that research is being conducted de facto on the specific question they 
are dealing with. Still other authors, very few of them, make this kind of consideration the 
explicit subject of part of their publication. In the search for the fundamental questions, these 
are valuable, but not definitive indications. They must be subjected to a critical evaluation by 
the philosophical metatheorist himself: 1. Can an allegedly fundamental question not after all 
be classified as a subordinate question to a more fundamental question? 2. is this question 
important enough to be a fundamental question of philosophy? It is precisely this second 
critical criterion that refers to evaluations and thus also practical justifications of what is 
important. These assessments and justifications must ultimately be made by the metatheorist, 
but on the basis of the philosophical theses and arguments found and the explanations found 
about the hierarchical relationships. 
At this point it becomes clear what is meant by "idealizing hermeneutics". 
Hermeneutics: On the one hand the metaphilosopher tries to understand the merely assumed 
or also stated or actually existing hierarchical relations of questions. Ideal: On the other hand, 
however, he does not simply take over what is empirically found, but rather evaluates the 
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actually existing or assumed relationships and formulations of questions and attempts to 
construct an ideal from this, which takes over much of what is empirically found, rejects 
some of it critically, supplements other things. The ideal aimed for is a system with one (or 
few) highest and philosophically important questions and subordinate questions, which 
illuminate partial aspects or aim at premises for the answer to the superordinate question. The 
importance of these topmost questions is practically justified. And the thesis is that a certain 
type of question is actually the central question, i.e. with a very high value for humans of the 
associated answer and being at the top of a hierarchy of questions. The central argument 
within the metatheory is the justification of the value judgement of the high value of the 
central question. Through idealization, the idealizing-hermeneutic theory of philosophical 
theories and arguments becomes a normative theory in the broad sense; it is suitable as a 
model for the construction and evaluation of philosophical theories and arguments. 
The combination of hermeneutics and idealization has the following sense. The point is 
to establish a good, indeed the best system of philosophical questions and theses and thus a 
theory of what a good philosophical theory is. But if one wanted to answer this question a 
priori, one would ignore the wealth of knowledge contained in the philosophical theories that 
actually exist. The knowledge contained therein should be incorporated into the development 
of the philosophical metatheory. These insights are contained in the construction of the 
philosophical theories themselves and in the philosophers' pronouncements on them. But the 
real insights are mixed up with many misconceptions and are incomplete; many 
developments are carried out only intuitively and are by far not always understood by the 
philosophers involved. Here, the metaphilosopher has to sort out, filter, according to his 
justified reflections on the importance of philosophical questions and on hierarchical relations 
between questions. And he has to put together the remaining pieces plus additions to form a 
complete ideal. 
Even leaving aside applied philosophies such as applied ethics or special theories of 
science, there are over 20 sub-disciplines in philosophy, each with its own specific central 
questions, one or more. But many of these questions are structurally similar, and the answers 
to them must be based on the same kind of argument. In order to separate argumentation-
theoretically essential statements from those about a plethora of individual cases, in a next 
large step the various central individual questions must therefore be ordered according to 
types, for example types such as universal generalization or instrumental judgment of 
optimality. With this step one moves from the level of a theory of different philosophical 
theories to a theory of different philosophical theory types. Good theories of the same type 
then also use argumentations of the same type. With this step, the basic structures of the 
individual theory types and also those of the associated arguments can be better clarified, 
because analogies can already be evaluated or established at this level. In addition, the 
analogization can also reveal gaps, superfluous pieces or other misguided developments at the 
level of the theory of a single philosophical theory. 
The just described idealizing hermeneutics in developing a theory of philosophical 
theory types itself already exemplifies one of the philosophical theory types to be presented in 
the following, precisely that of idealizing hermeneutics. And the advantage of this is that the 
approach presented here already contains its own metatheory and justification. A justification 
is provided without leading to a regress; and circularity of justification is avoided by the use 
of practical argumentation, which itself is again based on the psychological structure of our 
decisions. 
What is gained by such an idealizing-hermeneutic theory of philosophical theory types 
and philosophical argumentation? 1. First of all, this theory provides a well-founded 
normative ideal, a positive and well-founded template for the construction of 
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methodologically sound arguments that are appropriate to the goals of philosophy. 2. By 
emphasizing the central role of certain arguments within a theory, an idealizing-hermeneutic 
theory of philosophical arguments helps to better identify these arguments in practice and in 
the interpretation of arguments, if they are only rudimentarily present, if they are to a large 
extent wrong or if they are misunderstood by the author or by many recipients. For example, 
the corresponding philosophical text may simply consist of a sketch of a good or better 
instrument compared to other alternatives, but without much arguing that this is a better 
instrument than others or specifically than those known so far. 3. Finally, a normative theory 
of philosophical argumentation allows one to evaluate and understand existing philosophical 
arguments more precisely. 
 
3. Types of philosophical theories - an overview 2 
 
According to the above description, the systematic first step of the idealizing-hermeneutic 
theory of philosophical theory types is to determine the fundamental questions of philosophy. 
Here let me just say this much about this: There is presumably not the one question of 
philosophy. Attempts to determine precisely one such question - for example, the question of 
the ontology of all things or of the (all-encompassing ) formal semantics - always seem to 
exclude at least half of philosophy. Rather, each sub-discipline of philosophy has its own 
question or even several questions that cannot be reduced to one another and whose object is 
also hinted at in the title of this discipline. For the search for philosophical theory types it is 
important that the top answers to these questions are formally similar in different sub-
disciplines; for example, universal hypotheses of law or value judgements about instruments. 
And around each of these formally similar main theses there is a circle of subordinate theses 
that are also formally similar across different sub-disciplines. These types of central theses 
with the corresponding subordinate theses then form the core of a theory type. The theory 
type also includes the methods for justifying these theses and the respective arguments 
themselves. My attempt to systematize such theory types and reduce them to a few has led to 
four philosophical theory types. These will now be briefly introduced and then characterized 
in more detail in the following scetions. 
1. Descriptive-nomological theories identify basic structures, nomic characteristics and 
regularities of man and the world. Descriptive-nomological theories merge fluidly with 
psychological, social science and natural science theories. However, they can be 
distinguished from these sciences in the intention they pursue and the nature of the laws 3 
they aim to establish: While, for example, the natural sciences – formulated slogan-like – 
with a technical intention strive, among other things, to determine the elementary laws of 
nature with which all events can be explained, philosophical descriptive-nomological 
theories, with a (self-)enlightening and orienting intention, strive for knowledge about the 
invariant specifications of our existence, so to speak about the limits of the area in which we 
can move. For this purpose, measured by today's scientific standards, an overview knowledge 
of a specific area of laws or a knowledge of molecular laws is often sufficient. This 
knowledge is mostly needed again in idealizing-hermeneutical or technical-constructive 
                                                 
2  A preceding version of the theory of philosophical theory types outlined below has been published in 
Italian: Lumer 2011b. A current complete and English version is only available in manuscript form so 
far: Lumer 2020. 
3
  These laws need not be strict, they can also be statistical. Also "nomological" in the name for this kind 
of theory is to be understood in this broader sense: Descriptive-nomological theories also include 
theories with statistical laws. 
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philosophical theories. – Disciplines with descriptive-nomological theories include 
philosophical anthropology, general theory of action, philosophy of mind, theory of pre-
linguistic cognition, cosmology, but also certain parts of social, state, and legal philosophy, in 
so far as they determine regularities of the natural phenomena and social structures under 
study. The descriptive-nomological theories correspond to a large extent to the ideal of 
methodical naturalism in philosophy; however, here they are considered only as one of 
several philosophical types of theory. 
2. Idealizing-hermeneutic theories aim at self-enlightenment about the practical sense 
of certain types of actions, of action products, action and decision rules, conceptual systems, 
epistemological models, ontological constructs, etc., i.e. of objects that humans can directly 
influence and shape. While descriptive-nomological theories aim at a nomological self-
enlightenment about the area and the limits within which we move and the leeway within 
them, idealizing-hermeneutical theories inform about the way we move in this area in a 
practically rational way, how we make reasonable use of the empirically given leeway. 
Although this philosophical self-enlightenment contains empirical components, it is not 
meant to be purely empirical, psychological or sociological. Rather, it aims, for one thing, at 
(better) understanding one's own well-founded intentions, goals, what one actually wants to 
achieve with these objects, in order, among other things, to be able to pursue the really 
worthwhile goals more purposefully. For another, it serves to filter out the ideal means that 
have already been used to achieve these goals. From the understood actual goals and means, 
an ideal is constructed which, in the best case, has already underlain – possibly even only 
partially – what we have actually created. Idealizing-hermeneutic theories are thus on the one 
hand to a certain extent empirical, in that they seek to understand a factual practice, actually 
used means etc. On the other hand, they are normative in a broad sense, more precisely: 
evaluative and consiliative, in that they select only the best from this material and construct 
an ideal from it. – Idealizing-hermeneutic theories are developed in the following 
philosophical disciplines, among others: in ethics, philosophy of science, aesthetics, 
philosophy of language, epistemology (as far as it refers to pre-linguistic models of 
knowledge and linguistic cognitions), ontology, in logic and argumentation theory, but also in 
the action-theoretical theories of freedom and responsibility. – Typical fundamental questions 
of idalizing hermeneutical philosophical theories are, for example: What is the sense of 
morality? What is the "logic" behind the criteria for good scientific practice? How is good 
language constructed, and then why is it good? Which among the common forms of 
argumentation or improved versions of it are good and why? 
3. Technical-constructive theories in philosophy aim at developing good, versatile 
instruments. They often tie in closely with the results of idealizing-hermeneutic theories. 
Idealizing hermeneutics usually already (roughly) defines the purposes, the standard outputs 
of the instruments to be developed. Technical-constructive theories then critically examine to 
what extent the other results of idealizing hermeneutics can be directly taken over or how far 
they only have a heuristic value for one's own construction activity. In the latter case, 
technical-constructive theories – following the idealizing-hermeneutic ones – define certain 
good standard outputs of epistemological models, actions, action products etc. and then 
develop general descriptions (rules, criteria) for forms of cognition, action or product 
structures that optimally realize these outputs, e.g. logical, argumentation rules, moral norms, 
scientific rules, descriptions of language structures, rationality criteria. In this development, 
technical-constructive theories can in particular also use the knowledge from descriptive-
nomological theories in order to determine margins for the instruments to be developed and 
the consequences of such instruments. The structures described are either well-constructed 
techniques or tools by which a number of purposes can be achieved when needed – such as 
criteria of knowledge or argumentation – or the descriptions represent rules of action which 
should be followed permanently – as in the case of the criteria of rationality and morality. 
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Since even the best factual structures found can usually be improved, all philosophical 
disciplines with idealizing-hermeneutic theories also have technical-constructive theories (the 
above list of disciplines under 2 could therefore be repeated here: ethics, philosophy of 
science ...); if there is little to improve, the transition between the two is fluid. 
4. Ontic-practical theories attempt to make statements about fundamental spheres, 
levels, forms and structures of reality which are fundamental for our understanding of the 
world, our possibilities of action and planning of action, but which lie beyond our world of 
experience: the existence of the (physical) external world, of other minds, theoretical entities, 
higher beings or the constancy of the laws of nature. Because these realities are completely 
beyond, transcend our experiences, for the justification of such ontic statements procedures 
are necessary that are not primarily or not at all empirical; they are transcendental in the 
general sense: lying before every subjective experience and making the knowledge of the 
objects in themselves possible. (Kant's own determination of 'transcendental' is already more 
specific, but also more cautious; he is concerned with the type of cognition, not already with 
the cognition of reality itself: "I call all cognition transcendental, which is not concerned with 
objects, but with our type of cognition of objects, insofar as this is supposed to be possible a 
priori" (Kant, CPuR, B 25). Kant's attempts at transcendental justification are deductions 
from analytical statements. Since in my opinion not a single one of them is argumentatively 
valid, this is apparently not a promising method of justification. (The analytical statements 
are mere postulations and too arbitrary, or the deductions are not conclusive.) More 
promising transcendental justifications are practical justifications in the style of Pascal's 
wager, which try to show: Despite the absence of any empirical proof of the existence of 
these hypothetical parts or structures of reality, it is better to behave as if they existed. 
(Pascal's argument (for the thesis that it is better to act as if God existed) is itself not valid. 
Here, however, we are dealing with the type of argument used by Pascal, which is 
epistemically effective and for which there are quite important argumentatively valid and 
adequate instances (Lumer 1997).) Without a minimum of empirical knowledge, even the 
practical arguments cannot show that these realities exist (p); but they can show that it is 
better to count on them firmly, to behave as if they existed (p). (To avoid misunderstandings: 
This is not pragmatic: it is not assumed that if one behaves in such a way and this produces 
good results, this shows the truth of the hypotheses (p), i.e. the existence of these realities. 
Even if this behaviour is successful, the truth of p still remains unproven; even the repeated 
success of inductively obtained forecasts, for example, does not show that the inductively 
based prediction will work the next time). – Ontic-practical theories exist in or are suitable for 
ontology, cosmology, epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, philosophy 
of science and philosophy of nature. 
This list of four types of theories and the further elaboration are, as I said, idealizing-
hermeneutic. Thus, they try to capture ideal types that are recognizable to some extent in 
existing philosophical theories, but which are de facto mostly only partially realized or often 
only appear as a possible vague and unclear goal or are only reflected in some aspects of the 
existing theories. There are only very few theories already presented in the literature that 
correspond to these ideals even to a fairly large extent, or even only according to the 
intentions of their author; some examples will be given below. Many of the theories already 
proposed do not even come close to these ideal types. The aim of the list is therefore by no 
means to categorize all existing philosophical theories – on the contrary, the vast majority of 
them cannot be subsumed here. 
 
4. Types of philosophical theories - further explanations 
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In this section, the types of philosophical theories that have just been presented in an 
overview are explained further. In the next sections, finally, the theses of these types of 
theories will be presented as well as the associated arguments. 
 
4.1. Descriptive-nomological theories 
 
What is the sense of descriptive-nomological theories? In addition to the information about 
ourselves and the structures of the world, which is both intellectually important and crucial 
for our self-understanding, descriptive-nomological theories in philosophy also provide 
empirical information required in the idealizing-hermeneutic and technical-constructive 
theories; in this sense, they have a supply function: The rational decision and desirability 
theory as well as the theory of free decisions require, for example, action-theoretical 
information about the nature and leeway of our decisions. Ethics needs moral-psychological 
information about motives for moral action. Theories of the person in practical philosophy 
need information from the philosophy of mind about mental causation or about the cohesion 
of consciousness. Normative epistemology needs epistemological information about the basic 
building blocks, functioning and capacities of our cognition. The normative philosophy of 
law, political philosophy and social philosophy each require empirical information from the 
empirical parts of these philosophies about the functioning and regularities of law, politics 
and society. Etc. The possibilities and consequences of subjective intervention in all these 
areas must be clarified. Other descriptive-nomological theories such as cosmology, on the 
other hand, seem to serve solely to inform about our world and thus indirectly to enlighten us, 
without having such technical supply functions. 
Examples of descriptive-nomological theories may be: large parts of Hume's "Treatise 
of Human Nature",4 Hutcheson's "Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and 
Affections" and more recently the theory of action in Brandt's "Theory of the Good and the 
Right" (Brandt 1979, chap. II; III; V; VII) and certain works of experimental ethics and 
philosophical moral psychology (e.g. Doris et al. 2010) or Solomon's analysis of emotions 
"The Passions" (<1976> 1993).5  In all these works, empirical theories of anthropological 
regularities are established, which then serve as a basis for normative considerations. 
 
4.2. Idealizing-hermeneutic theories 
 
The aim of idealizing hermeneutic philosophical theories is, first of all, self-enlightenment in 
an even narrower sense than in descriptive-nomological theories, namely self-enlightenment 
about human practice, about general practices or practices applied in specific groups, about 
institutions, rules or instruments used there: systems of knowledge, logical and linguistic 
rules, criteria for science and scientific methods, rules of argumentation, ethical norms and 
evaluation systems, political institutions, criteria for freedom, responsibility and practical 
rationality, etc. That such self-enlightenment is necessary at all is due, among other things, to 
the fact that such practices and instruments were developed in a historical process by many 
                                                 
4
  In particular, a large part of Book III is intended as a moral psychology. But there are also clearly 
normative pieces in it, e.g. the defense of the subjects' right of resistance (Hume <1739-40> 1978, 
III.2.9), whose method is far less clear. 
5
  The fact that a work is cited here or in the following as an example of a type of theory analyzed by me 
does not mean that it fully meets the standards developed here or is essentially true. It only means that 
it is characterized by an objective that essentially corresponds to the type of theory presented here. 
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participants and that the individual subjects and users are largely unaware of the reasons for 
these practices and instruments. These reasons are not laid down and, if they are, they are 
scattered and unknown to many. The rules and criteria for the practices and instruments are 
also not codified, so that the practices and instruments themselves are anything but uniform, 
many of them are also bad practices or only partially good. As a result, there are even 
complete misjudgements and major intersubjective differences as to what constitutes good 
practice and what the reasons for it are. 
Apart from the mere explanation of the practices and instruments and the reasons for 
them, idealizing hermeneutics also pursue directly practical goals, namely to assemble ideal 
instruments from historically found, only partially understood, heterogeneous and often bad 
or useless material. Idealizing hermeneutics must therefore not only know the individual 
practices and reasons for them, but must also evaluate these reasons practically and determine 
the best instruments, or first compile ideal instruments from the parts of the existing practices 
and instruments that are found to be good or optimal. At this point there is then a seamless 
transition to the technical-constructive theories (see below). 
This conception of idealizing-hermeneutic theories is based on an instrumentalist and 
constructivist understanding of many objects of philosophy. According to this, epistemology 
for instance has the task to develop good rules of cognizing, by whose observance as many 
important truths can be recognized as reliably as possible. The theory of science has 
analogous tasks regarding scientific rules of knowledge. The fully developed approaches in 
argumentation theory see argumentation anyway as a means to achieve a certain end: 
rationally justified beliefs, consensus, acceptance of an opinion. In ethics the goal is not so 
obvious, it could be the creation of a socially binding value system, which would then be the 
basis for resolving conflicts and planning social projects; but in ethics the determination of 
the sense of morality itself is still an open task of idealizing hermeneutics. Etc. 
The idea of idealizing hermeneutics is to put together an ideal instrument from the best 
justified pieces of reasonable practice. Such a research project uses two main types of 
knowledge. On the one hand, the reasons, ultimately the intentions, behind certain existing 
practices and instruments or even individual actions must be identified. For if there is a 
causally relevant sense behind these practices and instruments, it can only be present in the 
intentions of the respective subjects. However, these intentions are often unknown, not even 
the inventors of these instruments are known. Then, above all, the possibility remains to find 
the objectively best reasons for the instruments, i.e. to determine why and in what respect 
they are good. The key to all further findings, especially for later systematic research in 
technical-constructive theories, is to determine the purpose or, more precisely, the standard 
output of the respective practice or instrument. On the other hand, the reasons thus identified, 
but also the practices and instruments or pieces of them, must be evaluated. After all, the aim 
of idealizing hermeneutics is to filter out the best from existing practice. Finally, these pieces 
may need to be put together and completed to form an ideal organic whole. For this purpose, 
tentative completions are developed for these pieces, which are then also evaluated, so that 
the best complete instrument is determined. If the intentions of the inventors of the 
instruments cannot be ascertained and only the good reasons for the instruments and practices 
are identified instead, the emphasis of the research shifts to the second part of the research 
process: which of these hypothetical reasons are good reasons in the sense that they represent 
a correct positive evaluation of the instrument or elements of the instrument in question? 
Examples of existing idealizing-hermeneutical theories may be: Aristotle's "Organon", 
Frege's "Begriffsschrift", many a philosophical-historical work written with systematic intent 
- such as Lenzen's reconstruction of Leibniz's logic (1990) -, or current reconstructions of 
parts of our epistemic procedures such as Goldman's (1979) discovery of reliabilism or 
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Bayesian reconstructions of various non-deductive inference procedures (e.g. Bovens & 
Hartmann 2003). 
 
4.3. Tecnical-constructive theories 
 
The goal of technical-constructive philosophical theories is to construct versatile, useful 
techniques or to develop rules or criteria for the construction of such tools. Many technical-
constructivist theories have an idealizing hermeneutic counterpart; the main task of technical-
constructivist theory is then only to critically examine and, if necessary, optimize the 
instruments supplied by that one. The transition between idealizing hermeneutics and 
technical-constructive theory is fluent because, for example, the idea of an improved version 
is already discernible in some instruments that may be little known. Conversely, however, it 
can also be said that there are few already known instruments that could not be improved, 
which is a technical-constructive task. However, there are also technical-constructive theories 
without an idealizing hermeneutic counterpart, especially in the field of relatively formal 
theories: for example, multivalent logics, possible-world semantics, probability theory, 
quantitative utility theory or game theoretically based ethics. 
The systematic starting point in technical design is the specification of a desired 
standard output and the corresponding (approximate) input of the respective instrument. The 
specification of the standard output is therefore often the most delicate and controversial 
point in the research process as well as in the philosophical discussion. If for this aim the 
results of idealizing hermeneutics cannot be referred to, only general criteria for its 
determination remain: The standard output should be a good, multifariously fruitful, generally 
humanly interesting type of event or state, or a criterion for it from the subject areas of 
philosophy. In some philosophical disciplines, several instruments are developed at the same 
time; accordingly, several standard outputs must then be determined. The next step after 
understanding or determining the standard output is to understand or invent the functioning of 
the instrument being searched for, i.e. how, under common conditions, a standard input that is 
not too complex can be transformed into that output. 
Many examples of theories that have been carried out and are based on technical-
constructive ideas can be found in the constructive blueprints of political philosophy, 
beginning with Plato's "Politeia", at least to some extent also in the utopian state blueprints of 
Thomas Morus, Campanella or Fourier, for example, or in modern inventions of institutions 
such as Hobbes' theory of the strong state, Montesquieu's principle of the separation of 
powers or Grotius' international law and the idea of a league of nations – to the extent that 
these institutions were conceived as good instruments. But technical-constructive theories can 
also be found in other philosophical disciplines, for example in Gauthier's ethics (1986) ethics 
of cooperation for individual utility maximization, in Bentham's applied utilitarian ethics of 
punishment (<1780 / 1789> 1982, chap. 13-17), in Brandt's rational utility theory his 
conception of utility that is stable against new information and criticism by facts (Brandt 
1979, section I.2, Chapter VI), or in Beth's (1955) theory of semantic tableaux for testing 
predicate logical inferences. 
 
4.4. Ontic-practical theories 
 
Questions about 1. the existence of the external world, 2. the existence of other minds, 3. the 
constancy of the laws of nature, 4. the reality of theoretical entities and 5. the existence of 
higher beings are philosophically more or less very old. In everyday life, the first three 
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questions are consistently treated as positively answered; and a revision of this attitude is 
hardly conceivable. In this respect, philosophical speculation about these questions is merely 
theoretical in the sense of "idle". Nevertheless, at least for the anthropological self-
understanding it is not insignificant whether there are real reasons for these practical answers 
or whether Hume's sceptical, naturalistic assessment is correct that these implicit answers are 
based only on psychological tendencies. As is well known, the question of the existence of 
theoretical entities is not closed in the philosophical debate, but is probably practically 
irrelevant, whereas for many people the question of the existence of higher beings is not 
closed even in everyday life and is certainly relevant for action. These questions are ontic in 
their content, they ask about the existence or structure of something. (At least) most of them, 
however, are transcendental questions, which therefore cannot be answered by empirical 
means.6 
In the history of philosophy there have been various attempts at transcendental 
arguments, i.e. to answer the transcendental questions argumentatively without the – just 
missing – empirical arguments. The best known is Kant's analytical-synthetic approach, about 
which I already said above that it cannot be successful. Pascal's wager – i.e. the justification 
of the thesis that it is practically better to behave as if the transcendental thesis were true – on 
the other hand introduces a type of argumentation that could well be successful and represents 
a compromise: On the one hand, it leaves the actual transcendental question – 'does this 
(structure of) reality exist?' – unanswered; there is simply no empirical basis for answering it. 
(If there is such an empirical basis, then – according to the validity criteria for Pascal 
arguments (Lumer 1997, pp. 339, PP3) – this type of argument must not be used at all; the 
argument would be invalid.) On the other hand, it shows that our behaviour of simply 
assuming that these questions are answered in a certain sense is quite rational: it is practically 
rational; and this is shown with practical arguments. This type of argument therefore provides 
methodologically sound answers to transcendental questions, perhaps not satisfactory, but at 
least sufficient. For this reason, this type of philosophical theory is called "ontic-practical". 
So far I have not found any other methodically sound procedures for answering 
transcendental questions. If they exist, then there are several types of ontic-transcendental 
theory types (i.e not only the ontic-practical). In the following I can give very few examples 
of ontic-practical theories. Therefore, this proposal of an ontic-practical philosophical theory 
type is the most precarious of the four proposals for philosophical theory types made here. 
But it is also the least important because of the low practical relevance of the actual 
transcendental question – in contrast to the very relevant practical question. 
An example of an ontic-practical argumentation is Pascal's wager (Pascal <1669> 1936, 
pp. 954-957). Kant also develops ontic "practical" argumentations, but in a different, namely 
deontological meaning of "practical": If pure practical reason establishes imperatives that 
however require the truth of certain ontic assumptions, and these assumptions do not 
contradict the findings of pure theoretical reason, then pure theoretical reason must also 
accept these assumptions. Among the assumptions thus practically founded are the existence 
of freedom (Kant, CPrR, pp. A188; abstracts: A82; A79; A97), the immortality of the soul 
(Kant, CPrR, pp. A219-220) and the existence of God (Kant, CPrR, pp. A224-226). Kant in 
this context means with "practical": Pure practical reason establishes an imperative – which, 
however, has certain preconditions, which should therefore be assumed to be true. It does not 
mean, as here: It is better (and thus also a requirement of practical reason) to behave as if 
certain assumptions were true. I myself have outlined ontic-practical arguments for the 
                                                 
6
  Personally, I assume that the first four questions are indeed transcendental; the fifth question, however, 
is not, in my opinion, transcendental if it is additionally assumed that the higher beings have an 
influence on our world. Such an assumption introduces an empirical component into the theory of 
higher beings, which also makes this theory open for empirical confirmation or indeed falsification. 
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existence of the external world, for the regularity of the world, i.e. the constancy of the laws 
of nature, and for the existence of theoretical entities (Lumer 1997, pp. 332-334). 
 
4.5. Alternative conceptions of types of philosophical theories 
 
The listing of good theory types is implicitly also a listing of basically good methods in 
philosophy. The proposals just made are therefore in competition with common ideas of 
methods in philosophy. As a discharge of my dialectical duties I can only give a critical note 
on two important of them, why I did not include them in the list of valuable theory types. Of 
course this note does not replace a detailed discussion of these methods. 
Methodological naturalism in philosophy at least assumes that there is a continuity of 
methods from the natural sciences to philosophy, if the adequate methods in philosophy are 
not immediately assumed to be those of the empirical sciences. As the above presentation of 
descriptive-nomological theories in philosophy shows, according to which the methods of the 
corresponding empirical sciences must be used for these theories, methodological naturalism 
is definitely preserved in the present theory of philosophical theory types. The main problem 
of methodical naturalism is then that it considers empirical methods as the methods of 
philosophy and does not restrict them to one part of philosophy. In this way, all normative (in 
the broad sense) parts of philosophy are then lost; or methodological naturalists derive an 
ought from a an is, thereby violating Hume's law. A further problem is that in a pure 
methodological naturalism a criterion for delimitation from the empirical sciences is missing: 
Which empirical regularities or developments are why especially "philosophical", so that 
their investigation is regarded as philosophy and not as natural science? (It was assumed 
above that descriptive-nomological theories in philosophy have a function as a supplier for 
other philosophical theories. Of course, this possibility does not apply if such other 
philosophical theories allegedly do not exist at all). Methodical naturalism thus seems to 
abolish philosophy as such. 
Methodical intiutionism, which is currently very widespread especially in practical 
philosophy, bases its central philosophical theses on intuitions. Intuitions are tendencies or 
inclinations to agree to a proposition, or are even firm convictions of the proposition, which 
we have not gained through a process of reasoning and for which we cannot initially give 
epistemically or otherwise rationally good reasons. Characteristic of intuitions – as long as 
they remain such – Is that the way to acceptance of the respective proposition remains in the 
dark for the subject. There are at least three main versions of methodical intuitionism:  
1. Intuition as intuitive cognition (e.g. Ewing, Moore, Prichard, Ross; recently Audi, 
Huemer, Stratton-Lake): The classical version of intuitionism sees intuitions as cognitions of 
more or less evident truths. In ethics, this position is often combined ontologically with a 
strong moral realism. Problems of this version are: 1.1. No truth: Classical intuitionism 
provides no criteria how to distinguish false from true intuitions. Every intuition here 
automatically becomes "knowledge". But then there is no difference between truth and 
falsehood any more and therefore no cognition. 1.2. No cognition: It is precisely the intiutive 
character, the obscurity of the origin of acceptance that prevents the cognitive character. 
Certainly, we do not gain all our cognitions by inference. In the case of the non-inferential 
and more or less automatic ones, however, there is a reconstructible mechanism of cognition 
that ensures the correct content of cognition. In the case of visual cognition, for example, we 
can reconstruct that light rays fall on the perceived object and are reflected, penetrate our 
eyes, are translated into electrical signals on the retina, etc.; thus, the correct origin and 
reliability of visual cognition can be explained. However, because of the purely intuitive 
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nature of intuitions, there is nothing comparable to them. 1.3 Variability: In fact, in most of 
the fields dealt with by philosophical intuitionism, intuitions are intersubjectively very 
different – to a much greater extent than in the case of facts with proven cognitive potential - 
and also change biographically or even depending on the framing. 1.4 Complex, partly 
cognitive origin: Moral ideas and beliefs are based on (i) morality conveyed by the respective 
socialisation agents and hence intersubjectively different morality, (ii) the subject's 
confrontation with it and (iii) autonomous sources of morality such as compassion and 
respect. If moral ideas then appear merely as "intuition", then this entangled origin of our 
ever subjective morality makes it rather unlikely that they simply represent an immediate 
access to moral truths (of whatever ontological kind).  
2. Intuitions as unfounded opinions of the respective author: More recent forms of 
intuitionism no longer make the objectivist claim to knowledge of classical intuitionism, but 
see in the intuitions only the attitudes of the philosophical author, who, however, usually 
hopes to find a broad interpersonal agreement. Nowadays this version of intuitionism is often 
linked to a more sophisticated coherentization of intuitions, as it is supposed to be achieved 
by Rawls' (or Putnam's) reflective equilibrium (Rawls <1971> 1999, §§ 4; 9). Problems of 
this kind of intuitionism are: 2.1. Irrelevance of the intuitions of individuals: What is the 
relevance of the intuitions of a particular author? This author may hope that others share his 
intuitions or make his elaboration their own - intuitively. What would be gained by this? 2.2. 
Subjectivism without persuasiveness: Argumentatively, such intuitions do not help. Either 
someone is already convinced of these intuitions, in which case he does not need additionally 
the intuitions of others. Or he is not convinced; then the intuitions of the other person have no 
epistemic power to convince him. 2.3. Renunciation of justification where justification is 
possible: The abandonment of the claim to knowledge, as it was raised by classical 
intuitionism, is simply the renunciation of justification. Due to the reflexive equilibrium, the 
resulting intuitions may at least be coherent, but they are therefore not justified. If they are 
presented as justification, then every intuition is begging the question. And if the absence of a 
justification is admitted, then the justification is just missing; and this is too little, if more can 
be said about the issues under discussion, that is, if good arguments can be put forward: In the 
history of philosophy there have been and still are sophisticated rational debates on these 
issues between reflected people with subtle arguments that provide real justifications and do 
not stop at intuitions. Simply dispensing with reasoned answers is not a rational solution to 
open philosophical questions. Such solutions include developing good instruments or making 
and confirming strong and practically useful hypotheses. 2.4. Variability: Interpersonal 
differences and personal biographical changes of intuitions as well as framing effects 
(Sinnott-Armstrong) are preserved even if the epistemological character is renounced and 
more sophisticated procedures such as reflective equilibrium are used (see Critique 1.3 
above). 
3. Intuitions as a subject of experimental folk psychology: The most recent variant of 
intuitionism has emerged from its connection with experimental philosophy (e.g. Kahane). 
Instead of determining the intuitions of a particular philosopher more precisely, the intuitions 
of the population on certain philosophical questions are determined – often in a subtle, 
indirect way. Such a research approach becomes methodological intuitionism when the 
majority opinion thus found is seen as the answer to the philosophical questions – for 
example, what are the criteria for intentionality. (One can also examine folk-psychological 
intuitions, e.g. moral intuitions, for another purpose, namely to determine how they emerge, 
in order to generally explore the ways of moral judgement formation. This type of research is 
not philosophical intuitionism, but is part of descriptive-nomological moral psychology. 
However, most experimental philosophers who research folk intuitions do not clearly explain 
themselves for either of these two possibilities – which of course casts doubt on the sense of 
their research.) This form of intuitionism is also subject to various objections: 3.1. Populism: 
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If the philosopher is exchanged for the majority of the population as a supplier of opinions, 
this does not make the position thus supported any better. It is not unlikely that the opposite is 
true: The majority of the population has normally thought much less about the usually quite 
subtle philosophical questions than professional philosophers; accordingly, their answers are 
often more crude. 3.2. No epistemic character and variability: The mere fact that the 
majority's intuitions on these questions almost never approach 100% and are often 
interculturally different shows that they do not arise from any halfway reliable 
epistemological procedures. Other symptoms of this are framing effects (Sinnott-Armstrong). 
3.3 Renouncement of reasoning where reasoning is possible: Even recourse to majority 
intuitions to answer philosophical questions is a surrender of the claim to knowledge and a 
renunciation of reasoning with the problems already mentioned under 2.3. 3.4. Subjectivism 
without persuasiveness: Even an intuition shared by a larger group is, if this agreement is not 
a proof of cognition, argumentatively useless (see critique 2.2 above). 
 
5. Argument types in philosophical theories - A glossary 
 
In the following sections, the important theses of the four theory types are presented and it is 
worked out how they can be argued for. The types of arguments recommended here refer to 
the Practical Theory of Argumentation, an epistemological approach to argumentation theory 
developed by me. But there are also suggestions for similar types of arguments in some other 
argumentation theories. The theory of philosophical argumentation presented here also makes 
sense when using these similar types of argumentation. In order to avoid interruptions in the 
subsequent presentations, the required argument types are briefly presented here in the form 
of a glossary. 
General remarks on the Practical Theory of Argumentation: A general presentation of 
the Practical Theory of Argumentation as an approach to an epistemological theory of 
argumentation is: Lumer 2005 According to this approach, the standard function of 
argumentation is to guide cognition in order to arrive at rationally justified acceptable belief. 
The arguments work through conditions of epistemological principles for the acceptability of 
the respective thesis. An overview of different types of arguments is given in: Lumer 2011a. 
1. Deductive arguments: In deductive arguments (Lumer 1990a, pp. 180-209; 2005, pp. 
221; 235-236) the conclusion is deductively derived from true premises. 
Deductive arguments for predictions are a special case of deductive arguments with strict, i.e. 
certain empirical laws as premises. 
Deductive arguments of descriptive statistics: Descriptive statistics uses statistical principles, 
especially definitions, and calculates certain statistical key figures arithmetically in purely 
deductive steps. Correspondingly, statements in them such as 'The p-value of this correlation 
is greater than 0.99' are determined purely deductively – even if the individual deductive 
steps are no longer perceived due to the use of computer programs that perform these 
calculations. 
2. Probabilistic arguments: (Lumer 2011c) The thesis of a probabilistic argument is a 
(conditional) probability judgement; the theses include statistical statements or other 
probabilistic judgements. 
Indicatory arguments / arguments from sign (Lumer 1990a, pp. 221-223) infer from an 
indicator to the presence of another event or state by means of a strong statistical correlation 
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(red litmus paper as an indicator of acidity; the making of an assertion as an indicator that the 
speaker believes in the assertion). 
Genesis of knowledge arguments: (Lumer 1990a, pp. 246-260) contain (in however 
abbreviated form) a report on the verification of the thesis by another person and the 
transmission of this information up to the current speaker. It can then be probabilistically 
deduced from the current statement to the existence of the facts described in the thesis as the 
presumed starting point of this chain. 
Probabilistic arguments for predictions: The thesis is a prediction; at least one of the 
premises is a mere statistical empirical law. 
(Explanatory) interpretive arguments (Lumer 1990a, pp. 223-246; 1992; 2010, pp. 147-154) 
are arguments that seek hypothetical explanations for known facts (e.g. corpse with gunshot 
wound, person sighted in the vicinity etc.) and then determine the probabilities of possible 
hypothetical explanations according to Bayes' Law. Usually the actual thesis is a small 
excerpt from one of these explanations (e.g. s was the killer), whose probability is equal to 
the sum of the probabilities of the hypothetical explanations in which it occurs. 
3. (Prudential) practical arguments (Lumer 2014) are arguments for value judgments; 
they follow decision-theoretical principles; they list the advantages and disadvantages of the 
evaluated object and summarize them in an overall evaluation. – Simple theories of practical 
arguments rely on intuitive, not necessarily well-founded or even wrong information-based 
preferences about aspects of the respective objects. In contrast, more critical evaluation 
procedures rely holistically on fully informed reflection (Brandt 1979, part I (= p. 1-162)) or 
on critical reconstructions and applications of basic evaluation criteria (Lumer <2000> 2009, 
pp. 350-427; 521-528). 
(Prudential) practical arguments for the justification of instruments: (Lumer 2011a, p. 24) 
are complex practical arguments: Various instruments are evaluated according to the basic 
criteria / principles of practical argumentation. The best of them is then determined in a 
deductive argumentation. – A special procedure for this is the multi-attribute utility theory 
(e.g. Keeney & Raiffa <1976> 1993; Watson & Buede 1987), according to which all 
compared instruments are measured and evaluated in certain dimensions, a certain weight is 
given to the single dimensions and from this the total value is then determined. Multi-
attribute utility theory, however, still relies on intuitive, not necessarily justified preferences 
about aspects of the respective objects. 
Practical arguments for assessment on the basis of the fulfilment of adequacy conditions 
(Lumer 2011a, p. 25) are a method for justifying value judgements if quantitative measures of 
desirability cannot be used. Adequacy conditions for desirable properties of the objects to be 
evaluated are established beforehand. The argument then lists which of these conditions of 
adequacy a certain object fulfils to what extent. 
Practical arguments for welfare-ethical value judgements: (2011a, p. 25) The thesis in this 
case is a moral value judgement. The assessment is based on welfare-ethical desirability 
criteria, i.e. definitions of moral desirability according to which this desirability is composed 
in a certain way of desirabilities for the individuals concerned. 
Pascal arguments (Lumer 1997) are practical arguments for theoretical theses. They are 
arguments for a value judgment of the kind that it is optimal to behave as if a certain thesis p 
were true. They presuppose that no theoretical information about p is available, so that no 
probability can be established. The argument then follows the criteria for decisions under 
uncertainty where the same probability is assumed for all possible worlds in which the 
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relevant consequences can occur (Laplace probabilities). The evaluation units are then 
expected utilities with Laplace probabilities. 
This list is not complete. In philosophy, all valid argument types can be used at some 
point. But this list contains the valid types of the arguments most frequently used in 
philosophical theories. 
 
6. Theses und arguments in descriptive-nomological theories 
 
According to the above outline (sections 3.1; 4.1), descriptive-nomological theories contain 
the following types of essential systematic statements or theses: 
TDN1 (= Thesis, Descriptive-Nomological, type 1): Definitions: Like all theories 
descriptive-nomological theories contain definitions or conceptual specifications of 
important terms. These definitions are at the same time explications of the 
philosophical concepts that are relevant for the theory. 
TDN2: Axioms: The systematic, central and theoretical statements, i.e. the axioms of the 
theory, are empirical laws. 
TDN3: Theorems: More specific, molecular, and universal theorems, which are particularly 
interesting for philosophy, are derived from the axioms. The exact content of the 
sought-after axioms and theorems can still be more precisely determined for the 
individual descriptive-nomological theories. 
TDN4: Confirming empirical material: The empirical material confirming the theory 
(including failed attempts to refute it) such as experiment reports, statistical 
elaborations and observations provides the necessary foundation. 
TDN5: Optimality of the axiom system: The optimality of the nomological axiom system 
(simplicity, explanatory power, empirical confirmation etc.) is proven in comparison 
with other theories. 
TDN6: Explanatory application of the laws: 1. Complex interrelationships that are 
philosophically interesting and especially important for our self-understanding, or 2. 
other philosophically interesting events or developments from the subject area of the 
theory, or 3. other phenomena from the subject area of the theory that are interesting 
for philosophy are compiled and explained with the axioms and theorems. 
 
The methods of descriptive-nomological theories in the creation of the theory core 
(TDN2-4) are first of all those of the corresponding empirical sciences. In most cases, but not 
necessarily, philosophers will not carry out their own methodologically sophisticated 
empirical investigations, but will, among other things, take up results from these individual 
sciences. Alongside this, descriptive-nomological theories of philosophy have theoretical-
axiomatizing functions: They formulate theories, theory sketches, models or parts of theory 
sketches which, among other things, answer the central empirical questions of the technical-
constructive disciplines in one way or another. Proofs of the optimality of theories (TDN5) 
are based in particular on criteria from the theory of science, but also follow the specific 
functional specifications from the supplier function of the respective theory for the idealizing-
hermeneutic and technical-constructive theories. They then use these criteria and 
specifications within a practical argumentation to justify instruments. The systematically 
concluding explanations (TDN6) follow the guidelines of philosophy of science for 
explanations, e.g. they are deductive-nomological in essence. The definitions developed in 
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the theory (TDN1) are, apart from their formal correctness, justified by the fact that with the 
terms defined in this way the synthetic statements of the theory, i.e. above all the axioms and 
theorems, can be formulated in a handy and precise way. This requirement for justification 
also applies analogously to the definitions in the other theories presented here (see below 
TIH1, TTC1 and TOP1). – In the appendix, the specification of the arguments to be used in 
descriptive-nomological theories, which is only hinted at here, is explained in detail. This also 
applies to the other three theory types. 
 
7. Theses and arguments in idealizing-hermeneutic theories 
 
Idealizing-hermeneutic theories contain the following types of essential systematic statements 
or theses: 
TIH1: Definitions: The theory contains definitions or terminological specifications of 
important terms that are used to formulate the synthetic statements of the theory. 
These definitions are at the same time explications of the philosophical terms relevant 
to the respective theory. 
TIH2: Description of the structure: The structure S of the ideal instrument is described. 
TIH3: Reality of the structure: The relation of the instrument to real practice is established 
by theses of the type: 'The structure S is a factually realised instrument' or: 'The 
structure Sf is part of S and part of a factually realised instrument' or: 'The structure S 
is an instrument composed of pieces actually used and supplemented elements'. 
TIH4: Function: The functions of the instrument are described: With which input does the 
structure lead to which output? 
TIH5: Way of functioning: The functioning of the instrument, i.e. how it transforms the input 
into the output, is explained. 
TIH6: Subjective reasons: The connection to the intentions of the users of the instrument is 
made by theses of the kind that the assumption of a certain function or of a certain 
output for certain subjects was an important subjective reason for the realization of the 
structure S or its parts Sf. 
TIH7: Hypothetical reasons: In addition, hypothetical reasons can also be given that the 
advantages of certain functions of S or Sf in certain standard situations would be good 
reasons for the realisation of these functions. 
TIH8: Objectivity of the reasons: The aforementioned reasons must be assessed as more or 
less good and important. 
TIH9: Standard output: One of the core theses is the determination of the standard output Os: 
The output Os (from the functions described in TIH4) is the standard output of the 
instrument S, i.e. the output that is objectively most important or at least very 
important (see TIH8), is often aimed at (TIH6), has been produced in most uses of S 
that are considered successful and is the cause of further, secondary outputs, which 
are, however, less frequently aimed at. 
TIH10: Ideal instrument: Finally, the central thesis is the evaluation of the instrument: S is the 
best / a very good one among those instruments for the realization of the standard 
output Os that are already factually realized or at least lean on factually realized 
instruments and contain essential elements from factually realized instruments. 
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Idealizing hermeneutics, as already expressed in the name itself, is conceived as a 
hybrid theory, a mixture of hermeneutic components and idealizations that are oriented 
towards instrumental requirements. Accordingly, the methods used in idealizing-hermeneutic 
theories are also heterogeneous. 1. For one thing, they aim at the compilation of existing 
instruments (TIH3) and their interpretation: for what reasons have they been realized? 
(TIH6). 2. For another, they determine objective functional relationships (TIH2, TIH4-5) and 
3. evaluate them (TIH7-8, TIH10). TIH9 is itself a hybrid thesis containing hermeneutic and 
evaluative components. 
1. The most thorough and, so to speak, last instance justification to prove the presence of 
other persons' subjective reasons are (explanatory) interpretive arguments. Their aim is to 
determine the mental causes of actions or action products; for these causes contain the 
subjective reasons, the sense, because of which the agent has performed the action. Thus one 
seeks the explanations of the actions or action products. 
2. The analysis of functional relationships in turn uses nomological knowledge from 
individual sciences, but above all also the results of the descriptive-nomological theories of 
philosophy; this is precisely the supply function of the latter. 
3. The evaluation of the instruments and their components is carried out with the help of 
practical arguments for the justification of instruments, in which the advantages and 
disadvantages of the respective object of evaluation are identified and weighed against each 
other. There are variously precise and critical procedures for this. Beyond the simple naming 
and roughly estimating evaluation of advantages and disadvantages, as we do in everyday 
life, multi-attribute utility theory already provides relatively complex quantitative methods of 
practical justification.  However, especially when it comes to the evaluation of e.g. life plans 
or moral commitment, evaluation procedures with critical components that can call factual 
preferences into question are necessary. At the fundamental level, in the determination of the 
most basic evaluation criteria themselves, only simple practical justifications can be used in 
the end, especially in the form that conditions of adequacy for the justification criteria are 
established and proven to be fulfilled; these adequacy conditions list the desired advantages 
and to be avoided disadvantages of the instruments (Lumer <2000> 2009, pp. 241-427). – 
The just said applies to prudential assessments. Most of the instruments to be considered in 
philosophy must also be first and foremost prudentially evaluated: criteria of knowledge, 
logical systems, ontologies, criteria of practical rationality, autonomy, etc. In some areas of 
practical philosophy, especially in normative and applied ethics and political philosophy, 
instruments are also developed for moral purposes, e.g. virtues, normative systems, and 
systems of governance. In these areas it makes more sense to evaluate the potential 
instruments morally. The criteria for moral evaluations are themselves instruments whose 
purpose, standard output, must be found and which can then be justified by means of 
comparative adequacy conditions. 
 
8. Theses and arguments in technical-constructive theories 
 
Technical-constructive theories contain the following types of essential systematic statements 
or theses: 
TTC1: Definitions: The theory contains definitions or conceptual specifications of important 
terms that are used to formulate the synthetic statements of the theory and that 
represent the explications of the philosophical concepts pertinent to the theory. 
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TTC2: Standard output: The desired standard output of the technology to be developed is 
determined. 
TTC3: Structure description: The developed instrument, i.e. the proposed structure of the 
constructed technology with which this output can be brought about, is described. 
TTC4: Function description: The detailed function is also described partly: With which input 
does the structure lead to which output? 
TTC5: Explanation of the way of functioning: The way the structure transfers input into 
output is explained. 
TTC6: Practical justification of the standard output: The standard output is justified 
practically by demonstrating that in many situations this output represents a desirable, 
multifunctional, fruitful and generally humanly interesting goal of action. 
TTC7: Practical justification of the structure: The proposed structure is also practically 
justified by showing that with the help of the structure the standard output can often 
be achieved in the best possible way; within this justification, among other things, the 
function of the structure is also positively evaluated and this evaluation is justified. 
TTC8: Applications of the instrument: Some technical-constructive theories in philosophy 
also have applied parts in which the developed instruments are applied to more 
concrete problems. The best known applied theory is of course applied ethics; but 
applied parts also exist in epistemology (e.g. discussion of relativism or skepticism), 
philosophy of science (some special theories of science) or aesthetics (aesthetic 
discussion of special objects). 
 
The specification of the standard output (TTC2) is an explanatory statement of intent; 
structure and function descriptions (TTC3 and TTC4), instead, are descriptions of the 
developed instrument. The justifications are given in the theorems TTC6 and TTC7. The 
function descriptions (TTC2 and TTC4) and their evaluations (TTC6, TTC7) are at the same 
time instructions for the use of the instrument presented in TTC3 and TTC4: How are which 
outputs realized with it? And when is it worth using the instrument, how good is the 
corresponding function? 
With the exception of applications (TTC8), all types of theses of technical-constructive 
theories also appear in idealizing-hermeneutic theories, although in some cases with a slightly 
modified function. (The counterparts are: definitions: TTC1 - TIH1; standard output: TTC2 - 
TIH9; structure description: TTC3 - TIH2; function description: TTC4 - TIH4; function: 
TTC5 - TIH5; justification of the standard output: TTC6 - TIH8; justification of the structure: 
TTC7 - TIH10.) The reference to already known instruments and elements as well as reasons 
(TIH3, TIH6) is dropped in the technical-constructive theories; in return, these are freer in 
determining the standard output and in the construction of the instruments themselves. This 
implies that the methods used to justify technical-constructive theories have already been 
dealt with in the presentation of idealizing hermeneutics: 1. explanations by means of 
nomological knowledge, especially from the descriptive-nomological theories of philosophy, 
2. practical justifications. The previously necessary interpretations of actions to determine the 
intentions of the inventors or users of the instruments are no longer needed. 
Technical-constructive theories are ultimately legitimized by the instruments they 
develop with good output; this provides them with a clear and good justification. In contrast, 
the value of many other philosophical theories, apart from the technical-constructive and, of 
course, the descriptive-nomological, idealizing-hermeneutical and ontic-practical ones, is 
unclear and questionable. 
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9. Theses und arguments in ontic-practical theories 
 
The theses of ontic-practical theories follow the conditions of the epistemological principle 
for Pascal arguments, i.e. pascalian epistemological principle: 
PP0: For all {p1, ..., pn}, s, d, t holds the following: 
PP1: If {p1, ..., pn} is a set of mutually inconsistent propositions which are altogether 
exhaustive alternatives, and 
PP2: if d is s' database at the time t, and 
PP3:  if for all pi from {p1, ..., pn} the database d does not contain any theoretical evidence 
for pi and ¬pi, so that d does not provide any empirical probabilities for pi and ¬pi, 
and 
PP4: if for all pj from {p2, ..., pn}, from t on regularly behaving as if p1 is true, on the 
database d and regarding only consequences relevant for orientation, has a higher 
expected desirability for s than behaving as if pj is true and than behaving as being 
agnostic with respect to {p1, ..., pn}, 
PP5: then on the database d it is epistemically optimum for s, with respect to the relevant 
alternatives, from t on to behave as if p1 is true. (Lumer 1997, p. 339) 
 
The central theses of ontic-practical theories then state that the conditions of this 
principle for epistemic rationality are fulfilled. These are the following conditions: PP1: p1, 
…, pn are mutually exclusive but together exhaustive propositions. PP3: The database does 
not contain any empirical information about p1, …, pn or their negations, so that the database 
does not provide empirical probabilities for these propositions. PP4: To behave regularly as if 
p1 of these propositions were true has, if one considers only the consequences for orientation, 
a higher prudential desirability than to behave regularly as if another of these propositions 
were true, or as if one were agnostic with respect to p1, …, pn. (PP5: According to the 
pascalian epistemological principle, it is then epistemically optimal to behave as if p1 were 
true.)  
Ontisch-practical theories therefore contain the following types of essential systematic 
statements or theses:  
TOP1: Definitions: The theory contains definitions or terminological specifications of 
important terms that are used to formulate the synthetic statements of the theory. 
These definitions are at the same time explications of the philosophical terms relevant 
to the theory. 
TOP2: Theoretical unrecognizability: The systematic initial thesis of ontic-practical theories 
is that the existence of the sphere of reality in question or a certain structure in such a 
sphere of reality cannot be recognized, not in principle (because of the basic types of 
our cognition) or not empirically (because this sphere of reality is inaccessible), such 
as the existence of other universes. 
TOP3: Suitable set of alternatives: An important prerequisite for the justification of the 
central thesis TOP4 is that one disposes of a list of alternative possibilities regarding 
the existence or shape of the reality sphere in question:  p1, ..., pn} are mutually 
exclusive but together exhaustive propositions about it. 
TOP4: Conditional optimality of the as-if behaviour: The most distinctive thesis of ontic-
practical theories is: It is optimal (in the sense of: has a higher Laplacean expected 
desirability) to behave as if the reality sphere in question (= p1) existed (namely better 
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than to behave as if one of the alternatives to p1 were true, or as if one were agnostic 
with respect to p1 and its alternatives). – This thesis must already consider all relevant 
possible worlds and also all relevant action alternatives. But it is a thesis about 
Laplacean expected desirabilities. This thesis itself leaves open whether it is rational 
in this situation to follow the Laplacean expected desirabilities. The condition for this 
rationality is the theoretical unrecognizability (TOP2). Only the following 
unconditional optimality thesis brings all these elements together. 
TOP5: Epistemic optimality of the as-if behaviour: The central thesis of ontic-practical 
theories is: It is epistemically optimal to behave as if the reality sphere in question (= 
p1) existed. 
 
The actually problematic theses of ontic-practical theories are those of the theoretical 
unrecognizability of the sphere of reality in question (TOP2) as well as those of the 
conditional optimality of the as-if behavior (TOP4) and, to a lesser extent, those of the 
suitable set of alternatives (TOP3). The methods usually used to gain insight into the 
unrecognizability of the reality sphere in question are thought experiments, i.e. the analysis of 
possible worlds. In this case we have to consider possible worlds in which, on the one hand, 
everything we really recognize is contained, but in which, on the other hand, the reality 
spheres or structures of the reality in question do not exist (e.g. Descartes' demon or 
Goodman's brain in the tank, which simulate the external world for us; Hume's billiard balls, 
etc., which in future will behave quite differently than billiard balls have done so far; 
Chalmers' zombies, which we cannot distinguish from people with consciousness) – which 
means that our information does not exclude this possibility or, conversely, does not prove 
the existence of the spheres of reality in question. Hence, for showing the unrecognizability, 
it must be shown with analytical means, deductive arguments, that these worlds are possible, 
i.e. consistent. (This would prima facie only prove the possibility of such worlds and thus 
would make possible arguments uncertain that the realities and structures we actually assume 
exist; but it seems not to exclude the possibility that we could prove the high probability of 
these realities – so there is no reason to get worried. But what should such a probabilistic 
arguments look like? Something like this: 'In the past, in m of n cases it turned out afterwards 
that the reality in question p1 does exist indeed. So it is likely to the degree m/n that p1 will 
turn out to exist this time as well.' However, the well-constructed possible worlds, in which 
just everything we really recognize is realized, in fact show that also up to now the existence 
of the reality in question or of the structure of reality has never been proved (or in Hume's 
case: the basis for the use of this probabilistic inference has never been shown, namely the 
constancy of the laws of nature which is still continuing even now.)/] – The method to prove 
the conditional optimality of the as-if behaviour are Pascal arguments (Lumer 1997). – 
Completeness and mutual exclusion of possible worlds can be proved purely logically by 
deductive arguments – especially when logical permutation has been used for the construction 
of the possible worlds. 
 
10. The theory of philosophical argument types as an idealizing-hermeneutic theory 
 
Is the theory of philosophical types of argumentation developed here, as claimed, an 
idealizing-hermeneutic theory? Yes. In the following, this answer will be justified in such a 
way that it will be shown that the present theory establishes and substantiates the theses 
essential for an idealizing-hermeneutic theory. However, I will not go into some less 
important theses for reasons of space. 
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Two peculiarities have to be taken into account when describing the idealizing-
hermeneutic character of the theory developed here. 1. This article is primarily concerned 
with philosophical arguments, not with philosophical theories. But often these two aspects 
are difficult to separate, because philosophical arguments are supposed to be arguments with 
which the theses of philosophical theories are justified. Also in the following presentation 
both aspects often have to be presented. 2. In this presentation a general theory of 
argumentation is already assumed, the epistemological Practical Theory of Argumentation – 
which is itself an idealizing-hermeneutic theory. What this theory has to say about the 
justification of the individual types of arguments - e.g. about the optimality of the proposed 
structures, i.e. arguments – will not be repeated here; it will only be referred to here 
(especially by the references to the literature in section 5). The task of the theory presented 
here is primarily only to show which of these types of arguments can be used to substantiate 
the theses that have been shown to be essential for good philosophical theories. If these 
argument types are themselves ideal instruments, then this completes the theory of good 
philosophical theories in such a way that this argumentative part of philosophical theories is 
also ideal. (This is the (implicit) optimality thesis (TIH10) of the theory of philosophical 
arguments.) 
TIH1: Definitions: In the theory of philosophical argument types, for example, the four 
theory types themselves are defined. The precise definitions of the types of arguments, 
however, are provided in the supplementary literature (see section 5). 
TIH2: Structure description: The structure descriptions of the theories consist here in 
the descriptions of the theses of the four theory types together with the descriptions of the 
types of arguments required or suitable for proving them. In other words: The assignment of 
argument types to the individual types of theses of the good philosophical theories is – if one 
can presuppose a theory of these individual types of arguments – the actual argumentation-
theoretical part of the structural description of the good philosophical theories 
TIH3: Reality of the structure: The reality of the proposed structure, i.e. of these types 
of philosophical theories, is shown by the examples from the history of philosophy at the end 
of sections 4.1-4.4. Some of these theories also use the arguments recommended here. (For 
the rest, the assignment of argument types proposed here is constructive: These are precisely 
the arguments fitting the respective theses.) 
TIH4: Function: Within the descriptions of the individual types of theories, a lot has 
been written about what the function of such theories is: Descriptive-nomological theories are 
supposed to provide, among other things, the special knowledge not provided in the sciences, 
but necessary for philosophical arguments in the other philosophical theories. Idealizing-
hermeneutical and technical-constructive theories develop good instruments for the individual 
fields studied in the philosophical disciplines: criteria for good arguments, for good scientific 
theories, moral evaluation, political institutions, etc. Idealizing-hermeneutic theories also help 
us to understand our practice in these fields, to understand the good reasons behind the 
practice and thus to continue this practice in a more targeted and adjusted way. Ontic-
practical theories help us to improve our epistemic practice with positive effects for our other 
actions (the assumption of theoretical entities, for example, leads to ontically simpler,more 
elementary laws of nature, which in turn make possible the construction of technical 
instruments that exploit these more elementary laws of nature). – The function of the 
arguments mentioned in this theory of philosophical arguments is to better justify the theses 
of each type of theory and thus to increase the probability of the truth of these theses. (If the 
author of a theory has given reasons for his theses in an argumentative way, he can better 
check whether they are true – which of course does not completely exclude errors in the 
checking –; if these arguments are presented to the addressee, the addressee can also check 
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the truth of the theses and is either guided to recognize the truth of the theses or, in the 
negative case, possibly encouraged to criticize them publicly, which in turn initiates a process 
of improving the theory.) These functions of argumentation have not been discussed in this 
article; they belong to the general function of epistemologically conceived argumentation (as 
analyzed e.g. in Lumer 2005, pp. 219-220) and are applied here only to the specific case of 
argumentation for philosophical theses. 
TIH5: Way of functioning: The way philosophical theories function together with the 
arguments for their theses is to guide the addressees' recognition of the theory so that they 
arrive at a justified belief in the theses of the theory. This way of functioning has not been 
specifically discussed here. It is again only a special case of the general functioning of 
argumentation as it is treated in the general theory of argumentation (Lumer 2005, pp. 221-
224). 
TIH6: Subjective reasons: The examples of philosophical arguments and theories cited 
from the history of philosophy that fit the types of theory and argument outlined here are 
implicitly at the same time information about the subjective reasons of the authors of these 
arguments. For by default, one can assume that the authors believed that these arguments 
would prove their thesis. 
TIH9: Standard output: The standard output of good philosophical theories and the 
arguments contained therein is the knowledge or the rationally justified acceptable belief of 
the recipients of these theories in the answers to the fundamental philosophical questions 
given therein. This has not been further discussed here because it is rather trivial. 
TIH10: Ideal Instrument: The justification of the thesis that the proposed theory types 
and the arguments for their theses are optimal instruments is not explained in this article in 
one piece. Instead, a sufficient number of independent parts of such an argument are 
developed at various points. The fact that several types of theories have been adopted here 
has of course the disadvantage of a certain inhomogeneity within philosophy, but it has the 
advantage that really all of the fundamental questions of philosophy, which are very different 
in nature, can be addressed and answered (and that not some of them have to be "twisted" or 
ignored) (see above beginning of section 3). The individual types of theory are then 
constructed in such a way that they answer the really important and genuinely philosophical 
questions which are not answered in the sciences and which in turn have a high practical 
relevance (see the sketches of the meaning of the individual types of theory in sections 3 and 
4.1-4.4). The criticisms of naturalism and intuitionism (Section 4.5) implicitly show that the 
theory of philosophical theory types and methods developed here is better than those and thus 
the best of the three. (The criticism of naturalism, conversely, was, among other things, that it 
cannot answer most philosophical questions because it does not contain a procedure for 
justifying value judgements or practical proposals. And the criticism of methodological 
intuitionism was that it provides no justification for its answers, so that these answers will be 
false to a large extent.) The layout of the individual types of theory, i.e. their structure, is 
justified in such a way that in each case a few theses directly answer the philosophical 
question, while the other theses are important suppliers and clarify e.g. necessary 
prerequisites (see the beginnings of sections 6-9). (In the descriptive-nomological theories, 
the empirical laws (TDN2 and TDN3) and the optimality thesis (TDN5) are the central 
answers; in the idealising-hermeneutical and the technical-constructive theories, the structure 
descriptions (TIH2 and TTC3) and the proofs of optimality (TIH10 and TTC7, respectively) 
are the central answers; in the ontic-practical theories it is the unrecognizability thesis (TOP2) 
and again the optimality thesis (TOP5).) – The ideality of the arguments proposed in this 
article for philosophical theories was hardly discussed here; for proving this ideality, 
however, reference was made (in section 5) to the corresponding literature. The selection of 
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the specific types of arguments proposed here for the individual types of theses, on the other 
hand, simply results from the fact that they are precisely those arguments by which, according 
to the rules of these arguments, these types of theses can best be justified. 
 
11. Epilogue – The importance of practical arguments 
 
One of the central theses - with only two types of central theses in each case - in the 
philosophical types of theory presented here is in each case an optimality judgement, which 
must then be justified in practical arguments (more precisely: practical arguments for 
justifying instruments). (In descriptive-nomological theories it is the thesis about the 
optimality of the axiom system (TDN5), in idealizing-hermeneutic and technical-constructive 
theories it is the thesis about the ideality of the instrument (TIH10 or TTC6 in connection 
with TTC7), in ontic-practical theories it is the thesis about the epistemic optimality of the as-
if behavior (TOP5)). This prominent role of value judgments and practical arguments in 
philosophical theories is surprising; it goes back to the instrumentalist understanding of 
philosophy implicitly propagated here and is in contrast to the more theoretical, 
contemplative, realistic or hermeneutic understanding of philosophy of many philosophers - 
at least for theoretical philosophy. But this theoretical understanding has begun to crumble - 
see e.g. Putnams (2002, especially the first two chapters ("The empiricist background" and 
"The entanglement of fact and value")) claim of the co-presence of descriptive and evaluative 
components in all theories. Perhaps the theory developed here will also help - in accordance 
with the second advantage of an idealizing-hermeneutic theory of philosophical 
argumentation (last paragraph of section 2) - to discover the already existing traces of 
practical arguments in actually practiced philosophical thinking and thus to show that 
philosophy is already much more practical than it seems to be. If my reconstruction of the 
theory types is really an idealizing hermeneutics and not only my invention, then some traces 
of this kind should be found. Moreover, the theory developed here could also help to develop 
better, practically oriented philosophical arguments and theories and to uncover the problems 
of existing alternative approaches.7 
 
Appendix: Assignment of argument types to the different theses of the philosophical 
theory types 
 
This appendix specifies more precisely which types of arguments can be used to justify which 
theses of the philosophical theory types. Mainly, this assignment is governed by the rules for 
the individual argument types, which, among other things, specify which types of theses can 
be justified by this argument type. However, the assignment also depends on the type of 
premises at hand. - This relatively trivial approach is made more complex by the fact that for 
various types of theses under the usual epistemic conditions, complex arguments have to be 
used, for which the premises are also further substantiated. With this kind of branching it 
sometimes becomes more difficult to identify the required lemmata. 
                                                 
7
  An example of this: Some philosophers see the incompatibilism of theories of freedom of decision as 
ontically or metaphysically given. Against this one could then argue that such ontic or metaphysical 
facts do not exist, that incompatibilist theories fail to make the value of indeterminacy understandable, 
and that the point is rather to define 'freedom of decision' in such a way that this freedom has practical 
value for us. 
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A. The arguments in descriptive-nomological theories 
 
Before the assignment of the types of arguments and other types of justifications that are 
suitable for the justification of the theses of a descriptive-nomological theory can be 
presented, some terms must be explained how they are to be understood here: 'axiom', 
'theorem', 'theoretical concept', 'theoretical entity' etc. Axioms and theorems are the core of an 
empirical theory describing the empirical laws. The axioms are a set of mutually independent 
law hypotheses, which are chosen as cleverly as possible so that their number is small and 
that the other law hypotheses, the theorems, can be derived logically from them. The axioms 
should also contain the basic, elementary laws of the theory, i.e. in a sense the core of the 
core. - To explain the observable, most empirical theories assume theoretical entities which 
are named by theoretical terms - such as 'electron', 'gravity', 'hydrogen', 'desire', 'joy' - and 
which cannot be perceived. (They are used to formulate more elementary connections, facts, 
which the theory assumes to be behind the perceptible).  Psychological, also everyday 
psychological terms such as 'desire', 'belief', 'fear', 'lust', are also theoretical terms when 
applied to other people. Some axioms (but often also some theorems) use exclusively 
theoretical terms as empirical terms; conversely, some theorems use exclusively perceptual 
terms, whose reference we can thus (in principle) perceive directly. (If the theory includes 
theoretical entities, then it usually does not include axioms that use as empirical terms 
exclusively terms of perception.) Finally, there are necessarily axioms and usually also 
theorems with both theoretical and perceptual terms. These axioms and theorems are the so-
called bridge laws that mediate between the theoretically hypothetized world and the 
empirically observable world. (Some of the bridge laws must be axioms, otherwise no 
statements, especially no theorems with perceptual terms, could be derived from the axioms. 
Examples of such bridge laws are: in action theory, laws of intention execution - a certain 
kind of intention (theoretical term) causes the intended movement (perceptible) under that 
and that conditions - in perceptual psychology, laws of generating perceptual content 
(theoretical) from sensory stimuli (perceptible), in physics, laws of the effect of forces 
(theoretically) on movements of bodies (perceptible)). Law hypotheses in which theoretical 
concepts essentially occur can never be confirmed directly, by perception. 
The following explanation of the individual justification possibilities in descriptive-
nomological theories does not follow the numbering of the types of theses, because of the 
many terms and differentiations that need to be explained and because of the systematic order 
of the explanations that differs from the numbering of the types of theses. 
TDN4: Confirmatory empirical material – Justification: The confirming empirical 
material behind theorems consists of observational statements. I distinguish here basically 
between three types of observation. Observational statements can 1. be formulated by means 
of perceptual terms and a. be verified by direct perception ('the pointer points to "9"', 'the 
respondent ticked option 3', ) or b. be based on an interpretation of what was perceived ('the 
x-ray image shows a fracture of the third cervical vertebra'; 'the aerial photograph shows the 
ground plan of a now buried dwelling'). 2. Or they may already contain theoretical terms of 
lower levels ('the voltage is 12 V'; 'the substance is strongly alkaline'; 'the patient has a 
melanoma on the left cheek'; 'the subject was embarrassed'); in this case, as already 
mentioned, also the mental predicates ('believe', 'wish', 'be pleased') count as (low-level) 
theoretical terms.  
Ad 1.a Perceptual observation of perceptual facts: In case 1.a the statements of observation 
are substantiated by corresponding perception; this is not an inferential justification, thus it 
cannot be substantiated and made verifiable by arguments. 
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Ad 1.b: Interpretive observation of perceptual facts: In case 1.b, the content of the 
observation would in principle also be directly perceptible (one could remove the tissue 
covering the fracture and look at the fracture directly; or one could remove the layer of earth 
above the building and look at the remaining foundation walls). However, what is in principle 
directly perceptible is actually not perceived (for various reasons), but is only represented by 
(standardized) indicators and must be " inferred" from there.This " inferring" can be based on 
an observation training, in which standardized indicators and direct perception or other 
feedback are compared, which is then perfected up to automation, so that the observer in an 
advanced stage does not consciously infer, but "perceives" that which is merely indicated (the 
physician "sees" certain white lines on the X-ray as fractures). In this case the observer will 
often not be able to reconstruct the basically inferential relationships. Or it is in fact an 
inferring in the broad sense, which consists of conscious cognitive steps, in the most complex 
case of an interpretive explanation of the directly observed ('the rectangle visible on the aerial 
photograph is interrupted on one narrow side for about 1 m; this could indicate an exit from a 
building, which would rule out that it is a walled pit'). Such an "observation" can then be 
reconstructed as an interpering argument. 
Ad 2: Interpretive observation of (low-level) theoretical facts: In the second case a theoretical 
statement is "inferred" from the directly observed. Here, too, there are different levels of 
inferring with more or less many conscious cognitive, inferential steps, which are then also 
open to an argumentative presentation. a. In the simplest case the observer reads a 
theoretically formulated measured value ('the voltage is 12 V'). Such observation statements 
are based on a low level theory of the measuring instrument, how this informs about 
theoretical facts. The designer of the measuring instrument could then provide the 
explanation for the transition from the observed to the theoretical facts indicated by it, but the 
actual observer usually does not. b. In more complex cases, the observation requires training 
in which certain phenomena – directly observed or only represented by media – are 
cognitively linked to associated theoretical facts whose existence is otherwise guaranteed. If 
the recognition of the linkages is sufficiently automated, the observer at some point "sees" 
directly the theoretical phenomena (the dermatologist "sees" the melanoma where others see a 
black-brown skin spot; the chemical laboratory technician "sees" the acidity of the tested 
substance in the colouring of the litmus paper) and then often cannot give any information 
about the inferential bases of this automated link. If, on the other hand, the observer can still 
reconstruct the inferential path, then it can be presented as deductive argument or as 
indicatory argument, in which the theoretical facts are deduced from perceptual statements 
(exact colour tone, distribution pattern of the colour etc.) with the help of a bridge law. c. In 
even more complex cases, the observer must infer the theoretical basis of what he has directly 
observed (e.g. by differential diagnosis, in which the physician excludes a series of prima 
facie possible diagnoses by specifically searching for secondary symptoms), or in the most 
complex cases again by an explanatory interpretation with hypothetical explanations of the 
directly observed, of which the best (i.e. the most probable among the conclusive hypothetical 
explanations) is then used as the best indication of the underlying phenomenon (e.g. a 
physicist explains the lines shown in a bubble chamber photograph as traces of different types 
of elementary particles, depending on their curvature; the psychologist explains the faltering 
in a subject's response as the result of an embarrassing touch). The quintessence of this final 
determination of the "observed" theoretical phenomenon can be presented as an argument, in 
the case of differential diagnosis as a deductive argument (based on differential diagnostic 
schemes developed in the literature), in the explanatory interpretation as interpretive 
argument. 
Shifting of the boundaries between these observation types: The boundaries between the 
perceptual facts that can be recognized by interpretive observation and those perceptual facts 
that are no longer observable, not even by interpretive observation, shift, among other things 
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by the invention of new observation instruments such as binoculars, telescopes, microscopes, 
..., X-ray apparatus, ultrasound apparatus ... or measuring instruments such as tachometers, 
laser range meters ... Also the boundaries between the theoretical facts recognizable by 
interpretive observation and those which are no longer observable are shifted by the invention 
of new observation instruments and measuring instruments: voltmeters, electron microscopes 
... or the invention of diagnostic guidelines. 
TDN3: Theorems – justification: In principle, theorems can be justified in two ways, 1. 
either they are logically derived from axioms, or 2. they are directly justified by observation 
and subsequent statistical processing of the observed data. In more sophisticated theories that 
postulate theoretical entities, the axioms that describe, among other things, the behavior of 
these theoretical entities cannot be directly justified by observation. Rather, in this case only 
certain theorems can be confirmed by observation, which then form the empirical basis of the 
theory. The corresponding axioms are then substantiated with the foundation of the whole 
theory (TDN5). 
Justification of empirical theorems by observation: If empirical theorems are justified by 
observation, the observation data (i.e. the confirming empirical material) are the premises 
from which the confirmation values (p-value, χ2 etc.) for the general hypothesis, the theorem, 
are calculated with the help of descriptive statistics (by deductive inferences, which 
nowadays are usually drawn by a software program). The calculation of the confirmation 
values consists of deductive steps, which can be represented in deductive arguments of 
descriptive statistics. 
The justification of empirical theorems by deduction from axioms: Apart from observation, 
additional theorems can later, when the axioms have already been justified, be obtained by 
deduction from the axioms, i.e. be justified in deductive arguments. 
TDN5: Optimality of the axiom system – justification: The empirical laws substantiated 
by observation – which will later be theorems – are the empirical basis for theory formation, 
i.e. for the development of an axiom system and theorems derived from it. Although the 
empirical laws founded by observation are the starting point for theory formation, in the 
axiom system they are usually "only" theorems that can be derived from the axioms, whereas 
the axioms in theories with theoretical entities cannot be observed directly. The purpose of 
developing such a theory, especially a theory that hypothesizes theoretical entities in its 
axioms beyond the observable entities, is to determine the more elementary, fundamental 
processes and laws that can no longer be observed behind the observable regularities; what is 
observed is then only the surface. For once the more elementary laws have been determined, 
a wealth of other ultimately observable regularities can be deduced from them, for example, 
at structures that have not yet been realized (including technical instruments) or at known 
structures in new situations (for example, predictions of human behavior in environments or 
situations that have not yet been studied, for example, the confrontation with new 
information). In order for empirical theories, axiom systems to fulfil this function, they must 
fulfil two groups of conditions. The first group (GDN1-GDN3) contains necessary 
conditions. Often several competing theories or variants of theories are developed. These are 
evaluated according to the second group of conditions (GDN4-GDN8), and the best of them 
is proposed as the best tool for explanation and prediction. 
I. Necessary (formal) conditions of a good theory: The core of the theory, namely the sets of 
axioms and theorems, must at least fulfil the following necessary (formal) conditions:  
GDN1 (= Good Descriptive-Nomological Theory): Coherence: The theory must be coherent: 
i. The axioms must be irreducible; ii. they must be necessary and iii. sufficient to 
derive all the theorems, in particular all law hypotheses confirmed by observation; iv. 
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the total set must be free of contradictions. 
GDN2: Confirmation: The theory must be confirmed: i. At least some of these axioms and 
theorems are empirically confirmed; ii. if an axiom is not directly confirmed, there 
must be confirmed theorems that can be derived from it (and perhaps other axioms); if 
no confirmed theorem can be derived from an axiom alone, but several axioms are 
needed for this derivation, then this theorem must not follow from the other axioms 
alone. 
GDN3: No falsification: The theory must not be seriously falsified.  
II. Optimization conditions of a good theory: In addition to the necessary conditions, there are 
a number of dimensional optimization conditions that a theory can fulfill to a greater or lesser 
extent and thus also well. The fact that they are "optimization conditions" means: They are 
not qualitative conditions that can or cannot be fulfilled, but comparative or quantitative 
conditions, which can therefore be fulfilled to a greater or lesser extent; their fulfillment is not 
necessary beyond an unspecific minimum, but is more or less good; the further they are 
fulfilled, the better. These optimization conditions are dimensional (mutually orthogonal) in 
the sense that the degree of fulfillment of one optimization condition is analytically 
independent of the degree of fulfillment of the other. A theory is the better, the more of these 
optimization conditions it fulfills to a very large extent and the further it fulfills them. 
Typically, some of these optimization conditions are in competition with each other in such a 
way that a better fulfillment of the one is often only available at the price of a worse 
fulfillment of the other. Therefore, to decide between different theories, these theories must 
be evaluated by balancing them: The degree of fulfillment of the optimization conditions in 
the individual dimensions is ascertained and the importance of the individual dimensions is 
determined. The (mathematical) products of the degree of fulfillment and the dimensional 
importance are then calculated for the various dimensions and then summed up; the result is 
the desirability of the theory. Such optimization conditions are:  
GDN4: Ontological simplicity of the regularities described in the axioms (few regularities; 
few types of entities; few entities involved in a regularity). 
GDN5: Semantic simplicity of the axioms. 
GDN6: Scope, i.e. how many phenomena of the phenomenon area of the theory are explained 
by the theory? 
GDN7: Connectivity to other theories in neighbouring fields or disciplines: Is the same 
terminology used in some cases? Does the theory provide a good basis for other 
theories and axiom systems? 
GDN8: Predictive power, i.e. can the theory not only provide explanations afterwards, but 
does it also deliver – as many and as accurate as possible – predictions? 
The practical justification of the theory: The value and optimality of empirical theories 
compared to other proposed theories can be justified by means of practical arguments for the 
justification of instruments (for this purpose, the additional technical tools of 
multidimensional decision theory can also be used). – Within the practical argument, a 
number of other arguments can be used to prove that or to what extent the conditions for good 
theories are met: Proof of coherence (GDN1) is done by deductive arguments. For the 
confirmation of the theorems (GDN2) reference is usually made to the literature; this is in 
principle a genesis of knowledge argument. However, some of the conditions can not be 
positively proved to be fulfilled: lack of falsification (GDN3). (One will then make do with 
the fact that so far no falsification is known.) Ontological (GDN4) and semantic simplicity 
(GDN5) as well as scope of explanation (GDN6) are determined by counting the elements in 
question; this is not argumentative; a final observation statement is made about it. The ability 
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to connect to other theories (GDN7) is justified by reference to the statements made in this 
theory and the terms used in it, with a source reference (genesis of knowledge argument) and 
subsequent deductive argument. The predictive power of the theory (GDN8) can be proven 
e.g. by a description of the precise parameters of this theory, reference to the observability of 
the variables in the antecedents of the corresponding laws and subsequent deductive 
argumentation. – The justification of the definitions and axioms of the theory is done within 
the overall justification of the theory. 
TDN1: Definitions – Justification: The formulation of the theory often includes 
definitions that help to express certain facts more simply, especially more elementary laws. If 
such definitions are additionally formally correct, their definition and use contributes to the 
ontological (GDN4) and semantic simplicity of the theory (GDN5). In this sense the 
definitions are co-justified with the theory as a whole (see TDN5). 
TDN2: Axioms – justification: Especially the purely theoretical axioms of theory cannot 
be confirmed by observation. In theory, they have the role outlined above, namely to 
contribute to an explanation of the observed by means of more elementary laws and to enable 
more predictions. It must be possible to derive theorems from the axioms; this was one of the 
necessary conditions for a good theory (GDN1.ii-iii). If the theory as a whole has been 
proven to be optimal and thus justified (see TDN5), these axioms are also justified. – In pure 
observation theories, however, axioms are justified in the same way as observation theorems 
(see TDN3). 
 
B. The arguments in idealizing-hermeneutic theories 
 
TIH1: Definitions – justification: In argumentation theory, for example, terms such as 
'argument', 'valid argument', 'ideal argument', 'fallacy', 'begging the question (petitio 
principii)' are defined. These are all key terms, which are used to describe things that are 
particularly important for the theory. But here two things must not be confused: (i) the 
justification of the structure of e.g. an ideal argument and (ii) the justification of the definition 
of the term 'ideal argument'. The former (i) is the subject of TIH10 (ideal instrument), not of 
TIH1. If the author develops a definition of the term 'ideal argument', in particular to include 
all the conditions for such an argument, and then considers why he uses this condition and 
why he considers that variant to be insufficient, it appears that he is justifying the exact 
definition. In fact, however, in doing so he justifies why an ideal argument should look like 
this and like that (TIH10). The justification for the definition of 'ideal argument', on the other 
hand, is only pragmatic: It is useful for the formulation of the theory and later for its 
application to have a term that captures structure of the ideal instrument in one word. There 
are many other pragmatic concerns that speak for or against the definition of a new term – if 
you name the parts, you can define the whole thing more easily later on; frequently occurring 
errors must also be able to be addressed in a catchy way, too many new definitions are 
beyond the capacity of memory ... Such pragmatic aspects can be weighed against each other 
in a practical argument for justifying instruments; the optimal solution is finally 
implemented. 
TIH2: Structure description – justification: The structure (with all details) of the 
instrument proposed as ideal is justified in TIH10. 
TIH3: Reality of the structure – justification: The thesis that the structure or pieces of it 
already exist is justified in the following way. 
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1. Existence of the structure: The existence of the structure can be justified as follows: 1.1. A 
structure itself contained in some text is cited (an example of an argumentation, an inference, 
a probability calculus, a linguistic phrase) and documented as genuine by a reference. This is 
an observation statement that is also made verifiable for others. 1.2. Or a structural 
description from the literature (the description of a political institution, a largely followed 
moral rule, a common scientific practice, etc.) is quoted and referenced. At least implicitly an 
indicatory argument is presented in addition to the observation statement, according to which 
the quoted description is an extremely strong indication of the existence of the described 
itself. 1.3. Or the author describes a structure he has experienced himself, which again is an 
observation statement. In all three cases, an additional indicatory argument is needed to 
justify that the structures thus documented as existing are due to the actions of a subject and 
thus to intentions – which then forms the basis for the assumptions about the subjective 
reasons (see TIH6) of this agent. 
2. Interpretation of the structure: Occasionally it is not obvious that what is described 
realizes the structure S at all. In such cases it must still be explained and in the most blatant 
case even justified with interpretative arguments, which pieces of the described realize which 
elements of the structure. 
TIH4: Function – justification: The exact description of the function of the instrument 
can only be justified in connection with the description of its way of functioning. The 
description of the function specifies for a number of possible relevant inputs which outputs 
the structure generates from them. To justify this description in detail requires a large amount 
of prognostic inferences about the many steps from the individual input under the conditions 
of the structure to the first intermediate step etc. up to the output. The overall argument for 
the individual function theses, that a certain input into the structure generates a certain output, 
is accordingly a complex deductive argument or complex probabilistic argument, which 
consists of a chain of elementary deductive or probabilistic arguments with which the 
predictions about the individual steps are justified. The individual predictions use strict or 
statistical empirical laws, especially those established in the descriptive-nomological 
disciplines of philosophy. 
TIH5: Way of functioning – justification: The description of how the instrument's way 
of functioning is usually only a generalised and simplified description of the various steps in 
how the structure generates the output from the input. It is therefore a summary of the most 
important steps of the transformation process described in the justifications of the function 
statements (TIH4). 
TIH6: Subjective reasons – justification: If one is lucky as the author of an idealizing 
hermeneutic theory, one will find statements from the authors of one of the examined 
examples of the structures dealt with in the theory, why they realized the example object in 
the respective form. Such statements are ideal indicators that this reason was actually part of 
the author's intention. And with an indicatory argument, this inference to the author's 
subjective reasons can be justified. If one has no such information, but has other relevant 
information about the author, such as his way of thinking, statements on similar objects, one 
can perhaps also conclude from this information and the fact that the author has realized this 
structure in an interpretive argument on his subjective reasons for this realization. 
TIH7: Hypothetical reasons – justification: Hypothetical reasons for the realization of 
the structure found are certain advantages and disadvantages that the realization of this 
structure normally has in this situation or in standard situations (compared to the realization 
of alternative structures), which therefore would also have been good reasons for the 
realization. If one knows a miniumum about the situation, one can justify the thesis that 
certain hypothetical reasons for the realization of the structure existed by means of a practical 
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argument, based on the situation information: The practical argument shows that the 
realization of the structure in this situation was good or even optimal for the author because 
of these advantages and disadvantages, i.e. their good and bad consequences. 
TIH8: Objectivity of reasons – justification: The subjective reasons (from TIH6) belong 
so far only to the hermeneutical part of the theory. In order to be able to include these reasons 
in the ideal part of the theory, i.e. to be able to use them as justification for the ideal structure 
or part of the ideal structure, they must be evaluated as more or less good or important. This 
judgement is the thesis of a valid practical argument for the use of the structure, i.e. for the 
thesis that the use of this structure was optimal, whereby in this argument also the examined 
subjective reasons occur. 
TIH9: Standard output – justification: The thesis on the standard output is: 'The output 
Os (from the functions described in TIH4) is the standard output of the instrument S, i.e. (i) 
that output which is objectively most important or at least very important (see TIH8), is often 
(ii) sought (TIH6), (iii) has been produced in most uses of S considered successful, and (iv) is 
the cause of further, secondary outputs which are sought less frequently'. The thesis therefore 
actually makes four statements. The justifications for substatements i and ii have already been 
discussed. Substatements iii and iv can be substantiated firstly by direct reports on such 
successes by means of indicatory arguments (the report is a strong indicator for what it 
describes) – for which, of course, such reports must be available – and secondly, with 
appropriate knowledge of the situation, they can be substantiated by hypothetical prognostic 
arguments, i.e. deductive or probabilistic arguments, in which statements on the 
consequences are substantiated from information on a causative event – starting with the 
input – on the situation and on empirical strict or statistical regularities. 
TIH10: Ideal Instrument – justification: The central thesis of the theory is an optimality 
judgement that the structure in question is optimal (or at least very good) among the 
instruments for the realization of the standard output which have already been realized or 
which can be constructed from at least partially realized elements of such instruments. Such 
theses are usually based on practical arguments for the justification of instruments. However, 
other, more primitive practical arguments for evaluations based on adequacy conditions can 
also be used to justify such optimality judgments. This is in particular necessary if the 
instrument to be justified is the prudential or moral desirability criteria themselves. Finally, 
the optimality of the instrument can also be understood in moral terms – for example, when 
justifying moral norms, social institutions or political constitutions. Then, arguments for 
welfare-ethical value judgements can be used to substantiate the optimality thesis. However, 
all these practical arguments contain a wealth of premises which themselves require 
justification. A number of such premises concern statements about which structures must be 
included in the value comparison. These are, for one thing, alternative structures that have 
already been realised, about which theses analogous to TIH3 are advanced and also justified 
in the same way. In the case of ideal structures which were composed just from existing mere 
partial structures, these alternatives are also various variants of the structure finally selected 
as ideal which were considered but rejected during construction. The evaluation that this one 
detail of the variant, which is different from the actually selected structure, would be worse 
because of this and that consequences, is then already the core of a practical argument, which 
is normally not carried out, but only hinted at, for the comparative thesis that an overall 
structure with this detail would be worse than the actually selected structure. Another 
important group of premises of the central practical argument concerns the consequences and 
implications of using the structure. For one thing, these premises are causal statements, 
hypothetical predictions that can be substantiated by corresponding deductive or probabilistic 
arguments. For another, they can also be analytical implications of the predicted 
consequences or implications based on certain social rules, e.g.: 'If the subject s has verified 
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conditions 1, 2 and 3 as a consequence of using the instrument, then s has verified all 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the validity of the conclusion'. These statements are 
also based on deductive arguments, but with analytical statements or formulations of social 
rules as premises. 
 
C. The arguments in technical-constructive theories 
 
All types of theses of technical-constructive theories are, as already mentioned, also present 
in idealising hermeneutical theories - with one exception, the applications of the instrument. 
Therefore, only references to the treatment of the argumentative possibilities of justification 
in idealising-hermeneutic theory need to be provided at this point. 
TTC1: Definitions – justification: see TIH1. 
TTC2: Standard output – justification: see TIH9. 
TTC3: Structure description – justification: see TIH2. 
TTC4: Function description – justification: see TIH4. 
TTC5: Explanation of the way of function – justification: see TIH5. 
TTC6: Practical justification of the standard output – justification: see TIH8. 
TTC7: Practical justification of the structure - justification: see TIH10. A change 
compared to the idealizing hermeneutical theories is that the comparison refers to any 
interesting structures, i.e. the limitation of the set of alternatives to already realized structures 
or structures of which essential elements have already been realized is not applicable. Thus, 
the proof of such a realization is also dropped. 
TTC8: Applications of the instrument – justification: The applications of technical-
constructive theories can be very diverse: If the instrument is a criterion, for example a 
criterion for prudential or moral desirability, for the validity of an argument or a good 
scientific theory, then the application of the theory mostly consists in the application of this 
criterion to concrete cases, which are then judged by the criterion. The corresponding 
arguments at the highest level are then usually deductive arguments; however, they can also 
contain as premises statements that can be substantiated in practical or probabilistic 
arguments. However, the application can also consist, for example, in not applying the 
criterion itself, but in referring to certain of its characteristics (e.g., for the proof of the 
relativism of moral commandments, a reference is made to corresponding relativistic 
components in the general criterion for moral commandments). These arguments are 
deductive. 
 
D. The arguments in ontic-practical theories 
 
How the theses of the ontic-practical theories can be justified, especially argumentatively, has 
already been largely clarified in section 9; however, some elaborations are still missing. 
TOP1: Definitions: The definitions required in the theory are pragmatically justified, as 
in the other types of theory, by means of practical arguments. 
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TOP2: Theoretical unrecognizability – justification: The core of the argumentation for 
the theoretical unrecognizability of the reality or structure of reality in question is the 
construction of possible worlds that contain everything we really recognize, but in which this 
(structure of) reality is missing. In the design rule for these possible worlds, it is generally 
stated which conditions are fulfilled in this world: e.g. everything we have experienced so far 
is fulfilled in the world, and the physical laws apply; or the course of the world known to us 
up to this moment is contained in this possible world. Then the test conditions for the possible 
world are introduced: e.g. all persons present in the world who are not identical with the 
reflecting subject, or a part of them have no mental life; or from the current moment, billiard 
balls on the billiard table's bands are no longer repelled at the same angle as the angle of 
incidence, but are reflected in the direction of origin. The possibility of this world is then 
shown in a deductive argument, proving that the design rules do not logically imply the 
negation of the test conditions (the inference from the design conditions to the negation of the 
test conditions is therefore invalid). 
TOP3: Suitable set of alternatives – justification: Important conditions for the 
suitability of the assumed set of possible worlds are the completeness of this set and the 
mutual exclusion of the individual worlds. The completeness of this set means that the 
disjunction of these worlds is true ('w1∨w2∨ ...∨wn' is true or P(w1∨w2∨ ...∨wn) = 1). This can 
be proved in a deductive argument if the possible worlds have been constructed by 
permutation. (For every single part ei of one world there is then the counterpart ¬ei in another 
world, so that the total set of permutations must be true). Also the mutual exclusion that two 
of these worlds cannot be true at the same time (for all not identical wi and wj holds: 'wi&wj' is 
false or P(wi&wj) = 0) is very easy to prove deductively in this case. 
TOP4: Conditional optimality of as-if behaviour – justification: The conditional 
optimality of the as-if behaviour is proved by Pascal arguments, especially adapted to the 
needs of ontic-practical theories. Important premises of this argumentation are the statements 
about the consequences of the individual alternative actions (in particular: to behave as if p1 
were true). These are again (hypothetical) prognostic statements which can be substantiated 
by deductive or probabilistic arguments on the basis of the nomological statements assumed 
in the design rule. 
TOP5: Epistemic optimality of as-if behaviour – justification: The thesis of the 
epistemic optimality of the as-if behaviour is in the end simply derived in a deductive 
argument from the other theses of the theory and the epistemological principle for Pascal 
arguments (pascalian epistemological principle). 
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